Economic impact of stimulated technological activity. Part 1:  Overall economic impact of technological progress:  Its measurement by unknown
//.J 23 - J_ _yo
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF STIMULATED TECHNOLOGICAL ACTIVITY
Part I - Overall Economic Impact of Technological
Progress--Its Measurement
J
FINAL REPORT
7 April 1970 - 15 October 1971
Contract No. NASW-2050
MRI Project No. 5450-D
For
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Headquarters
Technology Utilization Divisiun
Washington, D. C. 20546
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19730004253 2020-03-23T05:49:51+00:00Z
'_ PREFACE
This is one of five volumes which present the findings of a research inquiry into
the Economic Impact of Stimu!ated Technolo$ical Activity. The titles of the volumes are:
Part I - Overall Economic Impact of Technological Prosress--Its Measurement
Part II - Case Study--Technolo$ical Pro6ress and Commercialization of Communications
Satellites
i Part IIl- Case Study--Knowledge Additions and Earth Links from Space Crew Systems
Summary Volume--Economic Impact of Stimulated Tgchnolo$ical Activity
Bibliography
The research was sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Office of
Technology Utilization under the terms of Contract NASW 2050. The project staff of Midwest
Research Institute included: Robert E. Roberts, Howard M. Gadberry, Robert E. Fleisher,
Lawrence L. Rosine, E. Duane Dieekman, and Linda L. Crosswhite.
Principal consultants were Dr. M. Jarvin Emerson and Dr. Thomas J. Weiss for Part
I, Mr. Edwin J. Istvan for Part II, and }it. R. A. Bambenek for Part III. The project team
benefited from the suggestions of an advisory panel composed of Dr. Randall T. Klemme,
Dr. Charles N. Kimball, Dr. Kenneth C. Wagner, Mr. James A. Alcott, Dr. Richard Marsten, and
Dr. Werner Z. Hirsch. The contributions of Dr. Donald Silverman, an ex officio member of
the panel, are also acknowledged.
Acknowledgement is also made to the vital contributions of perhaps one hundred or
more scientists and engineers interviewed during the course of the study. Their cooperation
and that of their emp!oyers--NASA Centers and private contractors--was essential.
Special thanks are due to Joseph M. Carlson, the NASA Project Officer, and Ronald J.
Philips, Director of the Technology Utilization Division, throughout most of the project life.
The findings and judgments expressed in the report are those of the MRI project
team and do not necessarily reflect the view of the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration or those of any company or individual surveyed.
Approved for:
MII_WEST RESEARCH INSTITUTE
John McKelvey, Vice President
Economics and Management Science
22 November 1971
I iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I6
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VII.
VIII.
Introduction .................... i
Research Approach ................... 3
Summary of Findings and Conclusions .......... 4
Factors That Influence Economic Growth ......... 7
I
Technological Progress Defined ............. iS
The Technologist's Concept ............. 13
The Economist's Concept ............. 14
Technological Progress in This Research ...... . i5
VI. Economic Impact of Technological Progress ....... 16
Assumptions .................... 16
The Production Function ............ _ . . . 17
Aggregate Economic ImTpact: Gains Due to Technology. 21
' 25
Determinants of G t ............... _ • •
Gains Due to Research and Development ......... 38
I
IX. The Economic Impact of NASA R&D Activities ....... 51
Appendix A - Technology and Economic Growth: Basic Concepts and
Review of Recent Research ............. A-I
Appendix B - Calculation of
Appendix C - Adjustments to Gt .................
Appendix D - G(R&D) Generation Pattern ..............
Appendix E - Regression Analysis ................
Appendix F - Rate of Return Calculation ............. F-1
Appendix G - Manufacturing Industry Level Techno]ogical Progress. G-1
and G t ............ B-I
C-I
D-I
E-I
v
PART I
OVERALL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL
PROGRESS--_ASUREMENT
"The nation's technological capacity, which is concep-
tually analogous to the capacity of its physical plant, is
unquestionably a nation's most important economic resource.
By the same token, the rate at which its technological capac-
ity grows sets what is probably the most important ceiling
on its long-term rate of economic growth.
The rate of growth of a nation's technological capac-
ity depends jointly upon the rate at which it produces new
technology and the rate at which it disseminates the old."
Jacob Schmookler
Invention and Economic Growth
1966
I. INTRODUCTION
f
The central questions toward which this phase of the report is
addressed are:
1. What is the role of technological progress in national eco-
nomic growth?
2. What factors determine the rate of economic growth due to
technological progress?
3. Can the relationships between technological progress, its
determinants, and subsequent economic growth be measured--quantitatively?
4. And, how do the research and development activities of the
space program tie into the preceding questions?
Before World War II, there was little neea to ask such questions
at the national level. Most development was performed by the hallowed
individual inventor or by industrial laboratories supported by company
funds. Choices as to wi_ether or not to allocate res_,urces to development
and how to distribute resources among projects were made within individual
companies. Most of the nation's research effort w_ r performed at univer-
sities as an adjunct _o graduate education. National priorities had little
direct influence on t_e _llocation of resources to H&D, and the scale of
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R&D was small enough that the formulation of precise relationships between
R&D and the economy lacked urgency. In addition, economists as well as
political and business leaders vere too preoccupied with the effects of the
Depression and the implications of Keynesian economics to devote more than
passing attention to R&D.
R&D grew dramatically following World War II under the stimulus
of the Cold War and the race to combine atomic weapons with rocketry.
Massive mission-oriented R&D programs were mounted, using as their model the
Manhattan Project of World War II. All facets of research--basic and
applied--as well as development and sophisticated production plus scientific
and engineering education underwent huge federally funded expansions. A
strong scientific and technological capability became an essential instru-
ment for national survival--decisions to allocate resources to R&D were
made on the basis of necessity. The economic effects of the consequent
shifts of resources to highly technological endeavors were judged to be pos-
itive, but were not critical factors in the national'decision-making process.
By the late 19SO's, when the nation's first massive civilian
mission-oriented R&D agency--NASA--was created, the economic effects of
such undertakings were receiving explicit, if imprecise, recognition. At
about the same time, the short-term and regional economic impacts of expanded
R&Dbegan to receive widespread recognition. Community after community
strove to become another Route 128, or San Francisco Bay Area, or Huntsville.
The immediate benefits of a local R&D complex were clear. Less;clear were
the processes whereby R&D led to new or improved processes, products, and
services. But more important to the purposes of the present portion of this
report, the theory, methodologies and empirical data needed to quantitatively
measure the cumulative effect over time of the product and process advances
were sadly deficient.
During the 1960'_ a number of theorists and researchers undertook
to improve our ability to measure the economic impact of technological
advances, for it had become clear that technology was a large and powerful
force in the accumulation of national wealth. Pioneering work by Solow,
Kendrick and Denison was amplified and extended by a number of others.
Much progress has been made, but the fact remains that we got to the moon
in a decade, but are, as yet, unable to fully measure the present and future
economic impact of the science and technology accumulated on the way to the
moon (or the aggregate effect of technological progress in general). Our
present capability to measure the relationship between technological prog-
ress and R&D is even less precise.
Yet, national decisions with respect to the allocation of resources
to and within R&D are being and will be made. These decisions cannot be
postponed until precise measurements of their effects are possible. Thus,
the intent of this study was to provide--fromwithin i;heexisting state of
the art--some measurements of technology's contribution to this nation's
wealth during recent years and the role of R&D in generating growth through
technological progress_
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II. RESEARCH APPROACH
The investigations were performed at the national economic level.
We were exploring the aggregate effects of technological progress rather
than those stemming from individual inventions or innovations. Inadequacies
in all existing macro-economic yardsticks forced the study to focus on the
"cost savings" effects_ i.e., increases in the productivity of labor and
capital achieved through technological progress. The many improvements
in the quality of goods and services due to research and development are
not adequately reflected in existing aggregate economic series and cannot
be directly measured.
Given these restrictions on the scope of the study, six research
tasks were performed:
First, we adopted a definition of technological progress that is
consistent with how progress occurs and how it is generally perceived to
occur. In this definition we make a distinction between the technologist's
concept and that of the economist in viewing technological progress. Our
emphasis, of course, is on the economic impacts and we, therefore, favor
the economist's concept. .j
Second, within the framework of the definition of technological
progress and nee-classical economic growth theory, a _uitable macro-economic
production function was structured.
Third, a technology index implicit in the production function
specification was used to quantitatively assess the impact of applied tech-
nology on economic growth and output.
Fourth, having determined the level of technology and resulting
output, we related technological progress generating activities such as
research and development, economies of scale, education, etc., in a mathe-
matical model. Here, the determinants of technological progress were
linked to the effect of their stimulus in terms of incremental economic
output.
Fifth, through the use of statistical analysis, we empirically
determined quantitative relationships existing between growth due to
technological progress and determinants of technological progress.
Sixt_ within the preceding analytical framework, we examined the
economic impact associated with the technological stimulus provided by the
space program.
III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter synopsizes the major findings and conclusions devel-
oped during the course of our investigation of the role of technological
progress in the growth of the U.S. economy between 19_9 and 1968. The
analytical methodologies, research procedures, assumptions, and the under-
lying rationales for each are presented in detail in subsequent chapters
and appendices.
As have others before us, we found technological progress has
been a powerful force in economic growth. Our study considered:
- that technology is one of the factors of production--alongwith
labor and capital--with which the output requirements of the nation are
satisfied;
- that what we term technological progress is responsible for
improvements in the quality or productivity of lab@r and capital;
- that technological progress results from the introduction of
new or previously unused knowledge into the production process;
- that there are many mechanisms by which knowledge is productively
applied, including: improved worker skills, improved machine design,
!
improved management techniques, and so on.
Measuring the effect of technological progress--so defined--during the 19_9
through 1968 time period, we found that:
- The technology added to the nation's production recipe after
19A9 accounted for 40 percent of the increase in private, non-farm output
during the period.
- Cumulatively, total output for the period was about $8.2 trillion
in constant 1958 dollars. If there had been no increase in the level of
technology after 1949, the stock of labor and capital applied would have only
yielded a cumulative output of $6.9 trillion. Thus, the leverage on the other
two factors of production by technological progress permitted almost 20 percent
more output than might otherwise have been achieved with the same quantity
of labor and capital.
- Throughout the period the importance of the technology factor
in the production function increased at a compound rate of 1.7 percent per
year. By the end of the period--in 1968--the compounding growth of technology
had reached a point at which technological improvements beyond 19A9 levels
were accounting for 37 percent of output.
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Although it is possible to dissent on very valid grounds about
the exact amount of productivity gains due to technology, the major conclu-
sion is clear. Without the increase of technology and its introduction
into the production recipe, this nation would be substantially less wealthy
than it is. Much of the economic wherewithal we are now attempting to apply
toward the solution of pressing domestic problems is the product of applied
technological progress. To maintain and expand this economic capacity for
problem resolution, this nation must continue to allocate resources to enter-
prises which generate technological progress and encourage its productive
utilization.
This brings us to the second set of findings--those related to
the sources or determinants of technological progress. The theoretical
and empirical foundation for these assessments is less definitive thsn for
the preceding findings. However, there is general agreement on a list of
forces important in the generation of technological progress. The forces
are highly interactive but, for analytical reasons, were treated indepen-
dently. Our findings indicated that most of these forces were of insignif-
Icant effect during the relatively short time period under study. However,
three factors--the sex mix of the workforce, education, and R&D--were found
to be important determinants of economic gains through technological prog-
ress during the Post-World War II period. The first, sex mix, is the
product of increasing participation by females in the workforce and increasing
productivity by distaff employees. Improvements in this factor during the
period were put at 4 percent of the gains due to technology. Improved
worker productivity through higher educational levels contributed approxi-
mately 36 percent. The balance of the technology-induced gain--60 percent--
was attributed to R&D because other possible determinants had no measurable,
or identifiable, impact.
The relationship between R&D- and technology-induced economic
gains was explored on a distributed-lag basis. Lag distributions between
R&D expenditures and initial pay-back and final pay-out in the form of
national economic gains were constructed from less than definitive industry
estimates and experience, but when subjected to statistical tests the rela-
tionships exhibited reasonably good explanatory power. The findings were
that--on the average--each dollar spent on R&D returns slightly over seven
dollars in technologically induced economic gains over an 18-year period
following the expenditure.
This finding leads to the strong conclusion that, on the average
(including good, bad, and indifferent projects), R&D expenditures have been
an excellent national investment.
The final set of findings relates to the economic impact--via
technological progress--of NASA'sR&Dprograms. Assuming that NASA'sR&D
expenditures had the samepay-off as the average, we found that the $29
billion spent on civilian space R&Dduring the 1959-1969 period has returned
$86 billion through 1970 and will continue to produce pay-off through 1987,
at which time the total pay-off will have been $207 billion. The discounted
rate of return for this investment will have been 55 percent per annum.
As noted_ the preceding finding was based on the assumption that
NASAR&Dspending has an average pay-off effect; there is strong preliminary
evidence that the exacting demandsof the space program may produce greater
than average economic effects due to technological leverage. This comes
about because NASAallocates its R&Ddollar to the more technologically
intensive segments of the industrial sector of the economy. The weighted
average technological multiplier of the industries which perform research
for NASAis 2.1, while the multiplier for all manufacturing is 1.4. Although
there are a number of conceptual and procedural limitations to the construc-
tion of industry-level technological multipliers, the spread seemslarge
enough to support the view that highly technological undertakings, such as
the space program, do exert disproportionate weight toward, increased national
productivity.
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IV. FACTORS THAT I_TFLUENCE ECONOMIC GROWTH
Introduction
Per capita income or product is, as a practical matter, probably
the best single summary or surrogate measure by which to determine whether
and how much economic growth has occurred. Once the fact and amount of
growth have been documented, we can then proceed to explore how and why that
growth of total product has taken place.
Unfortunately, the list of factors which have some recognizable
influence on growth is lengthy.i/ What seems needed, then, is to start
with the central or nucleus determinant, and add other significant influences
as they can be defined and quantified.
Labor Inputs. One convenient starting point is the expression,
where:
Y = L(PASA+ %_M ÷ PsSs)
Y = total output,
L = total labor inputs,
(I)
"1
PA,PM,Ps = output per unit of labor input in agriculture, manufacturing
and service sectors, respectively, and
SA,SM,S s = share of total labor input from each sector.
The expression in the parentheses (PASA + PMSM +PsSs) then yields an
average output per unit of labor for the aggregate economy. Multiplying
this by the total labor inputs in the economy (L) yields total output (Y).
Average output per labor input can also be developed by substi-
tuting industry data for the sector data above. That is, (1) now becomes
y = _(PlSl÷ e2s2 ÷... )
_ = _(Z Pisi) ,
i
, or
l_/ For a closer look at.the historical evolution of economic concepts of
technological progress and its role in economic _rowth, see Appendix A.
where now:
]
1
Pi = output per unit of labor input in the ith industry, and
Si = share of total labor input from the ith industry.
Over time, total product (Y) could be increased by an increase in labor
inputs (L)_ by an increase in product per labor input in the various indus-
tries (Pi), and by a reallocation of labor inputs from industries with low
output per labor input to industries with h_gh output per labor input (i.e.,
changes in the relative Si's).l-/
Use of labor inputs as a starting point has a strong base in
economic tradition.
Looking back over most of the course of human history, until the
Nineteenth Century, the one fundamental or nucleus source of general economic
growth had been an expansion of total output. Expansion of total odtput, in
turn_ had been largely a result of increases in labor inputs--that is,
increases in size of labor force--contributed by such forces as population
growth, immigration_ slavery or captivity, and so on.2_/ Yet there had been
little significant gain in income per capita.3_/ Human society.was larger
and materially richer in the aggregate, but not appreciably better off in
terms of the economic well-being of its members. !
1
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This is not to say that there had been no rise in welfare. Except
for such setbacks and upheavals as followed the collapse of the Persian,
Grecian, and Roman cultures_ each age had been generally somewhat better off
than its predecessors. In qualitative terms, historians concede that the
life of the fuedal serf was in many respects a cut above that of his ances-
tors, just as the peasant and common man of Eighteenth Century Europe and
America enjoyed a quality of life, if not culture, above that of Rome.
l_/ Alternatively, we could view output as the sum of the various inputs
(land, labor, capital) weighed by their respective marginal products.
However, this suggested approach has the advantage of being more
directly expressed in terms of per capita welfare by virtue of exam-
ining output per labor unit.
2_/ For example, Edward Denison, The Sources of Economic Growth in the
United States (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1962), o
for an evaluaticn of the labor input variable in the Twentieth Century.
For Nineteenth Century evidence see Gallman, "Commodity Output in the
United States 1859-1899," Trends in the American Economy (New York:
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1960); and P. David, "The Growth
of Real Product in the U.S. Before 1840," Jour!Lal of Economic Histoz$,
27 (June 19 67).
J See Simon Kuznets, e_._ Income and Wealth of the U.S._ Trends and Structures
(Cambridge, England: Bowes and Bowes, 1952), pp. 221-41. 7
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But in economic terms, real economic growth--gain in welfare, as
measured by per capita income--had been relatively small, and ponderously
slow.
Capital. With the emergence of political and social changes in
the Nineteenth Century and growing industrialization, a second stimulus
to output began to be felt, and at an accelerating pace. That stimulus was
capital.
The role of capital in economic growth is too well known and
widely documented in the literature of social policy and economic thought
to require elaboration here. Perhaps a simple summation will suffice:
* First, addition of capital to labor serves not only to increase
total output, but also to increase output per capita. (More input yields
more output, plus the effect on productivity of labor.)
* Second, substitution of capital for labor may and usually does
increase total output (which is why it is done), and almost always increases
output per capita. (Tendency toward maximization of labor productivity.)
* When capital increases faster than labor inputs, the magnified
effects of simultaneous but disproportionate i_creases in capital and labor
can be dramatic.., at least up to a point.l-/ It is not difficult to under-
stand, then, why much of economic theory from Adam Smith to John Maynard
Keynes emphasized capital accumulation as a primary explanation of economic
growth.
Technology. By the Twentieth Century, still another force had
begun to find increasing recognition--that of technology and technological
growth.
Per capita income had clearly been rising. . and at a rate no
longer explainable simply by increases in labor input (work force and em-
ployment)3_/ or by growth of capital alone. In fact, the historical role
l_/ The latter concept--that of capital actually outrunning labor--is
largely one of recent origins, which has arisen from post-World War II
experience with mass infusions of capital into underdeveloped nations.
But since the issue turns about as much on the ability of a culture to
assimilate unfamiliar technology as on its ability to assimilate cap-
ital per s__e,the topic can be deferred at this point.
2_/ This was especially true of the classical economists, and of early pro-
posals designed lo set backward countries on the road to development.
3_/ Increases in labor force explain some 64 percent of the increase in out-
put in the Ninet_enth Century, but only 19 peruent in the Twentieth
Century. (GalLnan, op. cit., p. 34.)
9
¢of labor inputs, which we have described in a preceding section, had begun
to decline in importance.., and not just relative to capital, but rela-
tive to total output.l_/ Instead, what seemed to be at work was the nature
of capital, or of capital + labor combinations.
Over the years, many features have been identified within various
industries as explaining or contributing to this sort of second-stage rise
in capital-labor productivity. Among these have been such things as--better
organization of firm operations, economies of scale, improvements in the
health and education of workers, on the Job experience, and reduced down
time due to various physical and social factors.
In a general sense, these and other occurrences have been lumped
together and called, collectively, "technological progress." But even in
a narrower construction, the term "technological progress" has been widely
accepted to mean some prolific change in the nature or quality of particu-
lar capital or productive processes.
What was happening, then, was that not only was the amount of
capital increasing, but also it was a different, more powerful sort of
capital. The differences represented a favorable change or "growth" in
technology. Moreover, whether one viewed technological growth in its
broader or its narrower connotations, it was clearly present, _nd was
exerting a marked upward push on per capita income.
¢
At this point, two illustrations of the broader versus narrower
constructions of technological progress may be helpful.
Education. Education overall has been receiving increasing
attention in recent years. Long neglected as a component or determinant of
technological growth, education is now being heralded in that quarter, as
well. Why? Because in the field of international economic development it
is becoming painfully evident that both a generally educated populace and
a technically educated workforce are necessary ingredients for the success
ij Under the early "labor input" conceptions of economic growth, if in-
creases in labor input were to increase output per capita, then it was
essential either that (a) the labor force participation rate (percent
of total population gainfully employed) should increase, or that
(b) given a static participation rate, the average number of hours
worked should increase. But typically, as incomes rose, workers
chose to work fewer hours. Also, aside from _he effect of immigration,
the age structure of the population did not change dramatically, and
so the participation rate did not rise significantly. Instead, it
began to decline markedly following the boom _f trade unionism
in the early dea_des of this century.
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of new technology. Education--which can be thought of as an investment in
human capital through improvement in the skill and intellectual capabili-
ties of that human capital--is necessary in order to prepare workers for
handling sophisticated machinery, for realizing the value of changing tech-
nology, and for adapting their abilities to new equipment. Formal educa-
tion also provides a source of scientific personnel who devise further new
equipment, and a means of improving the ability of the entrepreneurs and
changemakers _ho decide when and how to use the new advances.
Education, then, may be viewed either as a component of tech-
nological growth itself (broad construction) or as an external stimulus to
it (narrower construction). Either way, however, it is clearly a contribu-
tor to economic growth, l-/ And, as in the case of the "chicken-and-egg"
analogy, in this context it may be immaterial which came first, the educa-
tion or the technology.
Also, another point here should not be confused as some
writers have apparently done: Education may be either a part of or stimu-
lus to technology, but it is not a substitute for technology. Education
alone cannot cause economic growth, nor can it stand as a sufficient expla-
nation for economic growth. Rather, the benefit of education, in the con-
text of economic growth, lies in its interaction with technology.
#
Economies of Scale. The matter of economies of scale is
a second source of sometime controversy. Many wouldmaintain that what
economists call economies of scale or economies of size could occur without
any change in technology. Indeed, this is the classic model. Others point
out that technology, too, may change without affecting scale. Either of
these is easy to deal with separately. But what of the third situation
where, because of some technological change in processes or materials, the
scale of some manufacturing operation may be greatly increased? If output
per worker is thereby increased, do we attribute the increase in product to
technology or to economies of scale?
Here, again, the point may be moot:
* In its broader construction, technological and economic
growth may include many instances in which a change in scale of economic
production is an outgrowth, or a natural accompaniment, or even an essen-
tial corequisite of technological change.
* Conversely, in its narrower consL_Lction, technological
change may be fully differentiable from economies of scale, with the latter
either an external proJuct of or stimulus to the techuological change.
l_/ The general effects of education--for example, on increasing labor
mobility--have long been recognized as positive
ll
On balance, it seemslikely that the technological change
will comefirst, opening the way for fruit_*_al advances in scale of plant
which could not have been achieved under the earlier level of technology.
Synthesis. The point of all this, of course, is not that such
forces as technological change, education, economies of scale, and the like
are competing factors which must be judged and scored for their contribu-
tions to economic growth, but that they are complementary factors which
reinforce each other in expanding and accelerating economic growth. The
confusion and occasional controversy arise out of attempts to measure and
separate precisely the effects of a particular variable on the growth of
output. But this problem is by no means peculiar to technological change.
As we have seen, these several growth-related factors are or may
be heavily interdependent, so that one can never ideally separate their
respective influences. All that can be done is, first, to establish work-
able measures, based on assumptions derived from the body of contemporary
economic theory, which serve to provide reasonable bases for assigning
shares of output among the conventional factors of labor and capital.
As a second step, the balance of output increases not traceable to mere
increases in the quantity of labor and capital can then be assigned to
intangible input factors such as education, technology, etc.--which, alter-
natively, can be lumped together under a broad construction of'the term
"technological change." In either event, this step requires further assump-
tions and empirical testing.
Often, then, technological change is simply lumped from the out-
set under the shorthand term "residual." And it is this residual which is
used to measure the contribution of technological change to growth in output.
12
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V. TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS DEFINED
The factor of technological change is a difficult concept to
define, since it is often accompanied by nearly simultaneous change in
education, allocation of labor, and scale of production. Further diffi-
culties arise in trying to separate and measure its effects. Typically,
then, technological change is viewed as all of these changes taken together,
and measured as the "residual." Thus, while only imprecisely measured,
technological change is shown to be THE pervasive growth element. As
Kuznets asserts, "continuous technological progress and the underlying
series of scientific advances are the necessary condition for the high rate
of modern growth."i/
Prior to any measurement of economic impacts resulting from tech-
nological progress, it is necessary to develop a conceptual framework
within which these measurements will be made. Possibly, the most critical
element of this conceptualization process is the development of a meaning-
ful and usable definition of technological progress.
The Technologist's Concept
g
The technologist--scientist, engineer, technician--normally views
technological progress in a framework of tecb_iques. He is concerned with
progress in technologies surrounding how products are produced, designed,
marketed, and the like. His scope of interest lies then primarily in the
pragmatic aspects of processes used in the flow from raw materials through
to final goods and possibly even the reformation and recycling of these
goods after their useful lifetime.
Although economic impacts of these improvements in techniques are
of interest to the technologist, his economic analysis is usually performed
on an extremely micro level. Often these take the form of marginal cost-
benefit analyses rather than the more global question of ultimate return on
the investment when considering potential replications of an innovation with-
in the economy.
In short, the technologist perceives technological progress as:
(1) improvements in production processes, (2) use of new materials, (3) im-
proved reliability and quality of final goods, (4) creation of new final
goods not possible with a previous technology level, stc. All of these, in
one form or another, are readily identified results of technological prog-
ress. They are often mauifested in new patents, new :_chievements, and so on.
Simon Kuznets, Six Lectures on Economic Growth (Ir_w York: Free Press,
19S9), p. 29, and Economic Growth and Structur_ (New York: W.W.
Norton and Compare, 196S), p. 19S.
13
The Economist's Concg_t
The economist is interested in the economic impacts of techno-
logical progress. Typically, then, he is not so much concerned with spe-
cific technological advancements but instead considers these advancements
collectively as one of the factors in the process of generating economic
output.
Since the economist is not concerned with identification of dis-
crete technical innovations, his orientation is normally directed toward
factors that cause these innovations of various forms--that is, in techno-
logical progress in its totality. Some of the factors normally included
in the determinants of technological progress are: (i) education,
(2) scale of operations, (3) quality improvements in capital and labor,
(4) increase in knowledge, (5) learning by doing, and others. These in
effect are the underlying stimulants to advances in the technology level
rather than manifestations of technological progress. The degree to which
any of the ftmdamlental determinants contribute to increased economic out-
put is the subject of a significant body of published research.
There appear to be at least three alternative ways of measuring
technological progress. Briefly, they are:
i. To explicitly estimate the separate effects of the individual
determinants of technological progress.
2. Determination of the overall or aggregate impact of techno-
logical progress and the subsequent disaggregation to the various deter-
minants.
5. Estimation of the total impact due to technological progress
with no subsequent attempts at disaggregation.
Because of the difficulties in estimation in the first approach,
it has been the least attempted methodology. The bulk of the research is
oriented towards the second and third approaches. Many researchers, after
measuring the aggregate impact, do not continue with the subsequent disag-
gregation because they believe that conceptually it is not possible to
treat each of the determinants on an independent basis. That is, many of
the determinants are highly related in a cause-effect relationship and it
is often difficult to clearly identify which is cause and which is effect.
As shown later, with appropriate assumptions, disaggregation can be per-
formed with estimates of comparable reliability to that of aggregate impact
measures.
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A more philosophical discussion of economic thought as it relates
to technological progress is contained in Appendix A.
Technological Progress in This Research
Because of the multi-faceted approach being pursued in this over-
all research program, our focus in this aspect of the research will be on
the economist's concept of technological progress. That is, we view tech-
nology as one of the factors of production, working in concert with labor
and capital. Because of the inherent difficulty of directly estimating
the technology level being utilized in production at any point in time, our
estimation procedures will consist of:
1. computing the output that should have occurred--expected out-
put--with known levels of utilized capital and labor, and
2. attributing the difference between observed and expected out-
put to technology.
Implicitly, then, if this difference--the residual--grows through time, one
is led to th2 inevitable conclusion that technological progress is the cause
of some fraction of economic growth. Output due to technology'can then be
distributed to the determinants of technological progress.
!
15
VI. ECONOMICIMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
In order to quantitatively assess the role of technological
progress in economic growth, it is necessary to utilize mathematical models
describing the mechanics of how output occurs through the combined influence
of all its causal factors. We use a production function consistent with our
concept of technology's role in generating output as discussed in the pre-
vious chapter.
Assumptions
As is the case with most modeling efforts, certain assumptions
must be made around which the model is constructed and later empirically
exercised. We will state, when appropriate, both explicit and implicit
assumptions as they are used.
In structuring the methodology to measure the aggregate impact of
technological progress, four fundamental assumptions are made.
i. Technological progress accounts for all output not explained
by increases in utilized labor and capital input. This assumption is con-
sistent with the bulk of published research in the field. It implicitly
states that output is created by the inputs of capital, labor, and tech-
nology. Then, if increases in output occur without comparable increases in
utilized labor and capital, the growth in output must have occurred through
an improved level of technology being used in the production process. It
should be noted that we have introduced the word "used." The reason is
simple--only technology being used, as opposed to being simply in existence,
contributes to output.
2. Improvements in the quality of labor and capital should be
measured as a component of technology. This is a particularly relevant
assumption when measuring the impact of technology in its broadest con-
struction--that is, in the concept of the economist who often perceives
technology as simply another factor of production. We will later depart
from this assumption when we attribute portions of the growth due to tech-
nology to the determinants of technological progress.
3. In the long run, the elasticity of substitution of capital for
labor for the U.S. private non-farm econom_ is asstumed to be equal to unity.
This assumption is made to assist in the specification of the production
function. Moreover, the bulk of research performed by others supports this
assumption at the long-run macro-level of interest. For a more detailed
discussion of the implications of this assumption, t_e reader is referred to
Appendix A--particul_:ly page A-11.
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4. Technological progress acts in a multiplicative fashion rather
than additive in augmenting labor and capital in the output-generating pro-
cess. This assumption is also widely accepted in that the additive assump-
tion leads to conceptually implausible results. Theoretically, it states
that output could be generated by technology alone--a result of little
intuitive appeal.
The Production Function
In light of the previously stated assumptions, a production
function of the form
Qt = f(Kt' Lt' At) ' (i)
where
Qt = output in time period t ,
Kt = capital utilized during time t ,
Lt = labor expended in time t ,and
.j-
At = level of technology applied during time t ,
f
is appropriate.l-/ If it is further assumed that technological progress is
"neutral," that is, the marginal rates of substitution of capital for labor
are not affected, Eq. (1) can be rewritten as
% = Atf(Y,t,L) (2)
Equation (2) is the fundamental equation used by Robert M. Solow2_/ in his
pioneering work in measuring the impact of technology on economic growth.
Because of its conceptual appeal and widely accepted results, we have ap-
plied his methodology in our empirical work.
l_/ See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of production theory and results
obtained with alternate production function approaches.
2_/ Robert M. Solow, "_chnical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics, August 1957, as reprinted in
M. G. Mueller, ed., Re adin6s in Macroeconomics (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Wirston, 1966).
l?
t!
Briefly, the methodology is as follows. By differentiating (2)
totally with respect to time, the following equation results.
where
Q A K T
_: _+ wk _+ wL _ (31
Wk= relative share of capital in income,
w% = relative share of labor in income, and
the dots indicate time derivatives• Assuming that wk = 1 - w% , Eq. (3)
can be rewritten as
where
q = Q/L and
k= K/L.
f
To compute A t , using (4), it is necessary to obtain series for:
i. output per man-hour,
2. utilized capital per man-hour, and
3. capital share of income•
We, as well as Solow, view the economic unit of interest to be the
U.S. private non-fsrm sector. Using a collection of data sources, we con-
tinued the original computations done by Solow for the 1909-1949 time frame
forward to cover the 1949-19_8 period. Table 1 shows the results in
tabular format. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the behavior of the
applied technology level or index A t for the 1909-1968 period. The data
sources and methodology are more completely described in Appendix B.
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Year
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1951
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
At
i. 000
0.985
i. 021
1.025
i. 064
i. 071
i. 041
1. 076
i. 065
1.142
1.157
1.069
i. 146
i. 183
i. 196
i.215
1.254
1.241
1.255
1.226
1.251
i. 197
I.226
i. 198
1.211
1.298
1.349
i. 429
1.415
1.64.5
TABLE 1
THE VALUES OF At
year
1939
1940
1941
1942
1945
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
-/
At
1.514
1.590
1.660
1.665
i.733
I.856
i.895
1.812
1.781
i.810
1.855
1,964
1.977
i. 979
2.025
2. 042
2.120
2. 090
2.103
2.125
2.183
2.196
2.253
2.309
2. 350
2. 413
2. 444
2.459
2. 489
2.540
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A cursory examination of Figure 1 discloses several interesting
facts :
i. In the long run, the level of applied technology has been on
a steady climb. In fact, the annual compound growth rate of At is greater
than 1.S percent over the period.
2. Two major departures from the steady climb of At both
occurred after the war years. One possible interpretation of these declines
is that the technology used during the war years was not utilized after the
war. This was, of course, occasioned by the dramatic influx of veterans
into the workforce. National priorities called for a departure from the
optimal use of available technology--in order to minimize unemployment.
3. A dramatic upward climb in A t has occurred since about 1929.
The reasons for this are manif01d--and vary among time periods. For example,
during the Thirties, capital expenditures were quite limited, unemployment
was at an all-time high, and industry was forced to utilize all possible
existing technology to create output with minimum levels of capital and
labor. After the slump in progress following World War II, industry purchased
increased productivity through improvements in the quality of capital. New,
more efficient machinery employing latest technological advances continued
the rapid rise in technology being applied in the private, non' farm sector.
Synthesizing observations made so far and the empirical results
obtained, technology--viewed in broadest terms as simply one of the factors
of production--has grown at a rate approaching that of output per man-hour.
So far, technology has been incorporated into the production
function as merely a multiplier-- At --to the combined effects of capital
and labor. In the next section we will develop an interpretation of At
consistent with our conceptual definition and in addition develop a
methodology that permits quantification of the impact of technological
progress in absolute terms rather than index numbers. That is, we will
convert the measure of technology's role in the output generating process
to a measure of dollars instead of an index number.
Aggregate Economic Impact: Gains Due to Technolo_
Referring again to the general form of the production function
used to describe the output generating process,
Q% = Atf(Kt, Lt) ,
21
it can be seen that At augments the combined output producing capabilities
of capital and labor. If, at some time period i , we let Ai = 1.0 and
using the input data for Ki and Li (these would be the actual quantities
employed), we determine f(Ki, Li) so that it must equal Qi --the observed
output in period i. In essence, we have forced the functional form of f
to be such that it describes all of the output in period i . Implicitly
then, the existing technology applied during period i is embodied in f
and the combined levels of capital and labor inputs.
Conceptually, it is then possible to hold the technology embodied
in f , Ki and Li constant. If comparisons between Qj and f(Kj, Lj)
are then made for any other year j (where Kj and Lj are assumed to
reflect quantities of capital and labor of quality existing in period i),
the difference between output and capital-labor productive capability must
reflect technological change relative to year i . Reviewing Figure 1 and
Table l, it can be seen that A1909 was set equal to 1.0 and that At
represents technological progress then relative to 1909.
Pursuing this line of reasoning to the next obvious step leads to
a quantitive dollars and cents measure of the economic impact of techno-
logical progress.
If Qt , for any year t , is divided by At a measure of output
that would have occurred in the absence of any technological change is
obtained. That is, since Qt = Atf(Kt, Lt), dividing both sides by At
yields
Qt
At Qt = f(Et, Lt) •
Since we have said that f embodies the technology being applied in a ref-
erence year, say, year i , and that measures of Kt and Lt reflect only
quantity changes relative to i , Q{ must reflect the output achievable
without changes in technology for any level of Kt and Lt .
A direct measure of technology's contribution to output can then
be obtained by differencing Qt and Q{ , recalling that Qt is an observed
fact. We call this difference the "gains due to technology, Gt , in period
t ." Mathematically,
(At - l)
Gt = Qt - Qt : Qt (At)
22
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Table 2 and Figure 2 show the quantity of Gt relative to 1949
for 1949 through 1968--the period of primary interest in this research and
the only period we will refer to from here on--in t_oular and diagrammatic
forms, respectively. It is noteworthy that we have now defined A1949 to
be equal to 1.0 since this is the reference year.
TABLE 2
GAINS DUE TO TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS, Gt
(1949 Base Technology)
(1958 $ millions)
Output with
Yea___r $ _ 1949 Technology Gt
1949 266,200 266,200
1950 294,900 278,208
1951 516,200 296,345
1952 324,200 303,558
1953 340,700 311,711
1954 335,000 303,993
1955 364,400 318,531
1956 371,400 329,255
1957 377,200 332,555
1958 370,900 . 323,365
I
1959 398,500 338,115
1960 407,600 343,966
1961 414,800 344,252
1962 444,600 356,822
1963 465,800 365,773
1964 491,200 377,266
1965 521,700 395,527
1966 552,300 416,202
1967 573,500 427,029
1968 604,200 440,700
Total $ 8,233,100 $ 6,869,133
--m
16,692
19,855
"20,642
28,989
31,007
45,869
"/ 42,145
44,865
47,535
60,185
63,634
70,568
87,778
98,027
113,934
126,173
136,098
146,471
163,500
$ 1,363,967
Summarizing, Table 2 shows that technological progress--in its
broadest definition--accounts for a significant portion of the total output
during the 1949-1968 period. Output during the period increased from $226
billion, in 1958 constant dollars, to $604 billion. The total output for
the period 1949-1968 was approximately $8 trillion. Had there been no
increase in utilized technology, output for the period would have been $6.9
trillion. Therefore, technology has contributed $1,564 trillion (or about
16 percent) of the tot_'1 output in the period. It La of interest that the
lion's share of this occurred in the 1964-1968 period. About $686 billion
of cumulative Gt occurred in these years. ..
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VII. DETERMINANTS OF Gt
As has been indicated previously, technological progress, when con-
sidered a factor of production, comes about because of the combined effects
of a number of determinants. We refer to these factors as thedeterminants of
technological progress and, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter,
since Gt is generated by technological progress, the determinants can be
considered in a "cause and effect" framework with respect to Gt . That
is, the determinants of technological progress are also the determinants
of Gt •
The goal here then is to assess the portions of Gt that can be
attributed to its various determinants.
The Determinants of Gt
Consistent with our definition of technological progress, there
are seven fundamental determinants of Gt :
,1. Age mix of the work force.
2. Sex mix of the work force.
5. Educational level of the work force.
4. Health of the work force.
5. Work-week length.
6. Economies of scale.
7. Research and development.
The degree to which any of these contribute to Gt varies. As
will be shown, this is particularly true in the 1949-1968 time frame where
some long-run effects are not as evident. The remainder of this chapter
will be concerned with the apportionment of Gt to the various determinants.
The methodology will consist of successive assignments of portions of Gt
to the determinants.
Our approach to the apportioning process is similar, ,in concept,
to the method used by Denison in his monumental work of 1962.1_/ In fact, we
rely heavily on some of his assumptions in areas where little, if any, quan-
titative data exist.
l_/ Denison, o__p.cit.
25
A$e Mix of the Work Force. In analyzing the potential influence on
economic output, as measured in terms of Gt , of improved productivity of the
work force because of shifts in its age composit{on, it is first necessary
to ascertain to what extent changes in the work force age distribution have
occurred. Clearly, if little change in the age composition has occurred,
then one could conclude that little change in productivity should result.
Data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that
there has been essentially no shift in the age distribution of the civilian
labor force from 1949 through 1968. Table 3 below shows the percentages
falling within the various age group cells.
TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE BY AGE GROUPS
(Percentage)
Age Group 1949 1958 1968
16-17 2.78 2.88 5.55
18-19 4.22 5.69 4.85
20-24 " 11.98 9.38 "/ 11.82
25-54 23.51 21.11 19.95
35-44 22.37 23.59 21.07
45-54 18.12 21.23 20.83
55-64 12.12 13.50 13.92
65 and over 4.90 4.62 4.00
Total i00.00 lO0.00 lO0.O0
Source : Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1970, U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S.G.P. 0.: Washington, D. C.).
Using the distribution percentage and the age cell midpoints,
the average age of the labor force is calculated to be 39, 40.3 and 39.5
years for 1949, 1958, and 1968, respectively. We assume that, due to the
negligible change in the average age of the labor force, there has been no
change in labor productivity in the 1949-1968 period due to changes in
age composition of tha work force. Therefore, the contribution to Gt from
age changes is zero.
Sex Mix of the Work Force. Similar to chaages in the age compo-
sition of the work force, changes in the sex composition, that is, the ratio
of males to females, could alter the productive capacity of the labor for_e.
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As might be suspected, there has been a continual change in the
work force sex mix during the Twentieth Century. In fact, this shift has
been significant even within the 1949-1968 time frame. Table 4 shows the
distributions in 1949, 1958, and 1968 for the non-agricultural, private,
employed labor force as taken from BLS data. As the data show, the per-
centage of females has risen from approximately 51 percent in 1949 to 58
percent in 1968.
TABLE 4
PRIVATE NON-AGRICULTURAL LABOR FORCE SEX MiX
1949 1958 1968
Thousands Thousands
Male 34,584 69.18 37,827 65.84
Female 15_L409 50.82 19,625 $4.16
Total 49,995 i00.00 57,450 i00.00
!
Source :
Thousands
44,957 62.35
27,147 57.65
72,105 100.00
-;
Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1970, U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S.G.P.O.: Washington, D. C.).
f
Clarence Longl-/ has constructed a series for "adult-male equiva-
lents" participating in the employed labor force for the decennial years of 1890-
19S0. This series gives an adult female worker a weight that rises gradually
from 52 percent of that of an adult male in 1889 to 67 percent in 1949. The
intervening years are weighted as shown below:
Year Adult Male Equivalent Weight
1889 52 percent
1909 54 "
1929 57 "
1959 58 "
1949 67 "
l_/ Clarence Long, The Labor Force Under Changing Income and Em_loyment
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1958).
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If it is assumed, as it was by Denison, that the growth in the
weighting factor in the 1929-1949 period will continue, it is possible to
compute--by linear extrapolation--the weights for 1958 and 1968. These are
calculated as 71.5 percent and 76.5 percent, respectively. Utilizing the
weighting factors, it is then possible to calculate the equivalent adult-
male labor force for each of the three years. In addition, the ratio of
equivalent adult males to total labor force can be calculated. This ratio
represents a measure of the productive intensity of the labor force in that
it simultaneously accounts for the relative decline in the percentage of males
and the increase of females as well as their productive capacity. Letting
the ratio equal lO0 for 1949 permits the construction of an index number
reflecting improved labor quality changes due to sex mix changes. Table 5
shows index values as well as base data for the computations.
TABLE 5
IABOR QUALITY CHANGES DUE TO SEX MIX CHANGES
19&9 1958 1968
i. Total Work Force (thousands)
2. Males in Work Force (thousands)
3. Females in Work Force (thousands)
4. Female Weighting Factor
5. Female "Adult Male Equivalents"
6. "Adult Male Equivalents" (2 + 5)
7. Fraction of "AME" of Total
8. Index of Labor Sality Change
49,995 57,450 ; 72,103
54,584 57,827 44,957
15,409 _ 19,625 27,147
0.67 0.715 0.765
10,524 14,050 20,767
44,908 51,857 65,724
0.898 0.905 0.912
i00.0 100.6 lO1.6
As Table 5 indicates, the index of labor quality change due to
changes in the sex mix and improved productivity of the female portion of the
work force has grown from 100.0 to 101.6 or an increase of 1.6 percent over
the 19-year period. This reflects an average annual growth of 0.08 percent.
Making the assumption that the index of labor quality changes due
to sex mix changes can be interpreted as a multiplier (after dividing by
100) to labor inputs of 1949 quality level, it is possible to recalculate
At and Gt reflecti_ quality changes in the labor force. These calcu-
lations yield contributions to Gt from sex mix cha,_ges shown in Table 6
and described in Apper_ix C.
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TABLE 6
SEX MXX CHANGES
Gt Due to Sex Mix Changes
(1958 $ millions)
1949 0
1950 523
1951 242
1952 530
1953 1,047
1954 1,191
1955 1,570
1956 1,845
1957 2,098
1958 2,072
1959 2,379
1960 2,857 -
1961 3,178
1962 3,531
1963 3,565
196_ 4,210 T
1965 4,780
1966 , 5,337
1967 6,099
1968 6,732
Total 53,586
The annual series of gains due to sex mix changes in the labor
force reflects the portion of the original Gt attributed to this determinant
of technological progress. The remaining determinants will account for the
balance of Gt . Specifically, the original total gains due to __alldeter-
minants has been reduced by 3.9Z percent to $1.510 trillion from $1.564
trillion in the 1949-1968 time period. It should be noted that although
the quality index grew only 1.6 percent in the period, the annual series
in Table 6 reflects the multiple effects of increased quantities as well
as quality.
Education cf the Work Force. It is widely recognized that prob-
ably one of the most important determinants of technological progress is
increased education of the work force. Undisputed are the relatively
higher earnings of that segment of the work force with high school, college
and graduate level edacations over those in the work forceof elementary
29
cschool, or less, educational attainments. Higher earnings, of course,
generate correspondingly higher contributions to the output of the private
economy. Denison devotes significant attention to this determinant of
technological progress in his study. In fact, he attributes approximately
one-third of the growth in output during 1929-1957 to increases in education.
Denison's index of the quality change in labor is constructed
through the use of various data sources and assumptions. Generally, the
approach is as follows:
1. He assumes three-fifths of the average income differentials
between groups with different educational attainments to be a result of
improved education. His 40 percent discounting is designed to reflect,
among other things, a potential correlation between basic intelligence and
educational level, greater energy, higher motivation and application that
would contribute to a possibly higher earnings potential without additional
education for these groups.
2. Based on data available for males 25 years or older, Denison
calculated what the average earnings would have been if the earnings at
each educational level were a constant fraction of actual 1949 earnings of
eighth grade graduates. He states that, "The differences from period to
period in average earnings can be used to isolate the effect of changes
in the length of schooling, measured in years, on average income."
5. Adjusting the above index for the increased days in school
per school year attended for each age group (reflecting when they attended
school) yields the full contribution of the increase in the amount of edu-
cation to labor output per worker.
4. All of these influences can then be interpreted simultaneously
in the form of an index number that would represent the relative quality
changes in the labor force due to improved education.
Using Denison's original series for the index of labor quality
changes due to education but converting the series to measure changes rela-
tive to 1949 (that is, we let the index equal 100 for 1949), we have con-
structed a series that reflects the effect of education on labor productivity.
Table 7 contains this index series. Our interpretation of this index is
that, for example, the productivity (output per man-hour) of the work force
in 1968 is 19.7 percent higher than the work force in 1949 due to improved
education, everything else remaining constant.
E
Table 8 summarizes that portion of gains due to technological
progress attributed t_ the two significant determinauts--sex mix and edu-
cational level of the labor force--discussed thus far. Appendix C presents
the detailed computations.
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TABLE 7
OF LABOR QUALITY AS AFFECTED BY EDUCATION
Year Index Year Index
1949 i00.0 1959 110.3
1950 i01.0 1960 ili.4
1951 102.0 1961 112.4
1952 103.0 1962 113.4
1953 104.0 1963 114.5
1954 i05.0 1964 115.5
1955 106.1 1965 116.5
1956 107.1 1966 117.6
1957 108.2 1967 ]_18.7
1988 109.2 1968 119.7
Year
m
1949
1950
1951
1952
1955
1954
1955
 956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
Gt DUE TO SEX
TABLE 8
MIX AND EDUCATION CHANGES
31
Gt Due to Sex Mix
( millions)
0
1,990
4,000
6,453
9,211
11,307
i&,416
18,945
20,498
22,205
25,885
29,400
32,086
35,806
39,317
43,581
48,696
54,670
59,875
r65_178
543,519Total
and Education
The combined effects of quality changes in the labor force dis-
cussed so far account for 39.8 percent of the original cumulative Gt
attributed to technological progress. Education itself accounts for a
55.9 percent reduction in Gt . In absolute terms, sex mix changes, age
mix changes and education account for $545 billion in the increase in output
during the 1949-1968 period. This represents approximately 8.7 percent of
the total output in the period. The other determinates of technological
progress account for the remaining $820 billion of the original cumulative
Gt or approximately lO percent of total output in the period. Wewill
investigate the apportionment of this balance to the other determinants
in succeeding sections of this chapter.
Health of the Labor Force. We, as have others, recognize that
because the general health of the labor force has been on a continual up-
swing, productivity of the labor force must have been affected. This, of
course, would be particularly true over the long run, say, 1900 to present.
The degree to which this change in productivity due to health would be
observable in a period of relatively short duration, as is the period 1949-
1968, is questionable.
Markley Roberts_/(asquotedby Denison) states that "improving
health has been an important factor in the advance of Americanproductivity,
and continuing improvement of health standards will contributeto further
economic growth." As Denison points out, however, Roberts neither quanti-
fied this judgment nor provided supporting evidence.,
Ne will assume that improvements in labor quality due to improved
health are not significant in the 1949-1968 time frame. Our rationale for
this assumption is as follows:
1. Given the relatively high levels of health in the United
States, increases over a 20-year span are probably fractional.
@. These increases in productivity have probably been offset
by increasing sick-leave benefits which are freely taken advantage of by
the labor force.
It is therefore implied that health improvement has not been a
significant determinant of technological progress and therefore has not
measurably contributed to generation of Gt during the 1949-1968 period.
Considerable research is required to quantitatively support this conten-
tion. Ne do not feel that our results will be sensitive to the outcome
of such research in that the quantitative results should support our original
assumption.
_/ Denison, op. cit.. p. 51.
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Shorter Work-Week Length. In the period of interest, the average
weekly hours of production of nonsupervisory workers on private non-agricul-
tural payrolls was reduced from 39.4 in 1949 to 57.8 in 1968.1_/ This
represents a change of 4 percent over the period or 0.214 percent per year.
We assume that this negligible change in hours has had no effect
on labor productivity--in terms of productivity per man-hour--over the
period. _lqis then implies that shorter hours have not contributed to Gt
in our period of interest.
Economies of Scale. Of the determinants of technological progress,
the most widely studied is probably economies of scale. The close relation-
ship between technological innovation and economies of scale is often viewed
in a circular cause-effect system. That is, it is difficult, in many iso-
lated specific examples to clearly identify which is cause and which is
effect--technology or economyof scale. Should the development of a new
automated production process capable of high production volumes at lower
cost be credited with the increased market penetration possible due to
lower cost or should scale economies take the credit? Clearly, one cannot
answer the question without a degree of subjective judgment.
Since scale is represented by size and if it is assumed that the
number of employees per establishment is an acceptable surrogate for size,
estimates of scale changes can be obtained. Data published in the 1967
Census of Manufactures have been used to obtain insights into scale changes
over the 19&9-1968 period. Table 9 gives the distribution of establishment
sizes for the Census years.
TABLE 9
PERCENT OF TOTAL MANUFACTURING BY ESTABLISHMENT EMPLOYMENT
Percent Establishments by Average Employees
i00- 250- 500- l,O00-
Year l-& 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 249 499 999 2,¢99 2_500+
1947 29.2 19.& 16.9 16.6 7.8 5.9 2.3 1.1 0.6 0.2
1954 57.3 16.5 14.6 14.9 7.4 5.5 2.1 1.0 0.5 0.2
1958 35.& 17.0 15.7 15.5 7.3 5.4 2.1 0.9 0.5 0.2
1963 36.5 15.8 15.3 15.4 7.5 5.7 2.2 1.0 0.4 0.2
1967 38.4 12.9 13.6 16.0 8.2 6.5 2.5 i.i 0.5 0.2
I_/ Handbook of Labor Statistics, 19693 U.S. Department of Labor,
Washington, D.C., July 1969, p. 128.
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An analysis of Table 9 indicates that there has been ess_ntially
no change in the percentage of firms with 100 or more employees in the 19_7-
1987 period. In fact, there has been a slight, but discernible, shift
from the 5-to-20 employee range to the 1-to-_ range during the period.
All of this then indicates that there has been no significant
upward establishment size shift in the 19_7-1968 period. We assume this
to be true for the 1949-1968 period as well.
Since no significant scale changes occurred in manufacturing, we
assume that improved economies of scale in manufacturing have been minimal.
A similar analysis in the selected services segment of the service sector
disclosed that there has been no significant scale change there as well.
In fact, establishments with 20 or more employees were 2.6 percent of all
establishments in both 1954 and 1965. We assumej then, that economies of
scale have not contributed significantly to Gt in the 19-year period of
interest within the private nonfarm sector.
Research and Development. The remaining determinant, R&D,
accounts for the balance of Gt . It is not surprising that the lion's
share of the original Gt should be attributed to this determinant. Of
all the determinants earlier cited and subsequently discussed, R&D is
possibly the only determinant which is specifically funded to increase the
existing technology.
At the firm level, R&D activities are conducted to:
* Improve production process
* Develop new consumption products
* Improve existing products
* Reduce marketing, administrative and distribution cost
of consumption goods.
Moreover, these are merely a sampling of broad categories of R&D
orientation within industry. All of these activities are performed with
specific objectives in mind, however. This objective is improved, or at
worst continued, economic viability of the firm.
At a macro le_!, such as public sector research in health,
transportation, space, e_c., the objectives vary. In an economic sense,
however, the result of all of these activities is increased economic output
and productivity.
Up to this poin_ we have examined all determinants of Gt on
our list except R&D. In total the determinants other _]han R&D were found
to account for approximately 40 percent of the economic gains due to
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technological progress during the 1949-1968 period. We presume that R&D
is the determining force behind the balance. Since _%D is the one deter-
minant specifically focused on the generation of new knowledge, problem
solving, and new or improved processes and products, it is no surprise that
the bulk of G t --60 percent--is attributable to the nation's R&D activities.
Table i0 indicates the shares of Gt attributable to the three
significant determinants: R&D, education, and sex mix during the period
under study. The other four determinants of economic gains from techno-
logical progress, age mix, work-week length and health, were found to have
negligible impacts during the 19_9-1968 time frame.
TABLE i0
GAINS (Gt) DUE TO THE DETERMINANTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
(1958 Million $)
Year Sex Mix Changes Education R&D Total
1949 0 0 0 0
1950 323 1,667 14,702 -j16,692
1951 242 3,758 15,855 19,855
1952 530 5,925 14,989 20,642
1955 1,047 8,166 19,778 28,989
1954 1,191 ' 10,116 19,700 51,007
1955 1,570 12,846 31,_53 45,869
1956 1,845 17,100 25,200 42,145
1957 2,098 18,_O0 24,567 44,865
1958 2,072 20,155 25,550 ¢7,555
1959 2,579 25,506 5¢,300 60,185
1960 2,857 .26,5&5 54,25& 65,65&
1961 5,178 28,908 58,4-82 70,568
1962 5,531 52,275 51,972 87,778
1963 5,565 55,752 58,710 98,027
1964 4,210 59,571 70,555 I15,95_
1965 4,780 _5,916 77,477 126,175
1966 5,557 49,555 81,428 156,098
1967 6,099 55,776 86,596 146,471
1968 _6,75. 2 58,446 ..._9£_522 165,500
Total 55,586 489,955 820,&48 1,565,967
of Total Gt 5.9 55.9 60.2 • i00.0
55
Figure 3 summarizesthe study findings with respect to economic
gains attributable to technological progress over the 1949-1968 time period.
Additional quantities of labor and capital supplied 57 percent of the growth
in the private nonfarm economy during the period. Technological progress
accounted for the rest or 43 percent with R&D the prime determinant for
26 percent and 17 percent attributable to all other technological progress
determinants. As a result of these trends, technology brought into pro-
ductive application since 19&9 was accounting for about 37 percent of output
by 1968. This translates into significant increases in labor and capital
productivity through technological progress.
i
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VIII. GAINS DUE TO RESEARCH A_D DEVELOPMENT
As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, R&D is the predom-
inant determinant of technological progress. In fact, during the period
19A9-1968, R&D generated $820 billion of additional output. This repre-
sents approximately lO percent of the total output of the economy in the
same period. In this chapter, we will develop the rationale for and empi-
rical parameter estimates of a model describing the R&D output generating
process. Our inquiry into quantitative relationships between R&D and its
associated gains in output, which we denote G(R&D) , will permit assess-
ment of economic returns from R&D investments.
]
]
]
1
1
1
Time Lag Relationships
1
It is generally agreed that there is a definite time lag between
R&D activity and when those activities contribute to economic returns--if
returns, in fact, occur. At the micro level, where one can deal with
discrete, identifiable technical innovations--a new product, process, etc.--
and the subsequent generation of economic impacts--increased sales, reduced
costs, etc.--it is possible to fairly precisely estimate this time lag
relationship. On the other hand, for macro economic systems such as the
private nonfarm U.S. economy, the time lag relationships become extremely
difficult to determine.
There are two major reasons for this difficulty:
1. It is practically impossible to identify the numerous techno-
logical innovations resulting from the widely dispersed R&D activities being
conducted within the system. The complexity of the process is illustrated
in Part II of the report.
1
[]
l
]
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2. It is equally as difficult to identify and quantify the
economic impacts of these unidentifiable innovations. ]
These difficulties can be overcome by utilizing two surrogate
measures for the cause and effect measures.
First, we assume that R&D--by design--creates a continuous flow
of technological innovations and that the measure of the "quantity" of these
innovations is proportional to the amount of the R&D _erformanee during
sometime period. It should be noted that our measure of "quantity" is not
necessarily an absolute measure, such as the number of patents issued, but
rather, the collective ability of these innovations te impact economic out-
put by creating G(R&D) .
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Second, as we allude to above, our measure of the economic impact
of R&D activity is the generation of gains in economic output unexplained
by the classical factor inputs of capital and labor and the other determi-
nants of technological progress. Specifically, our measure of the long-run
return from R&D is the G(R&D) stream generated by an expenditure for R&D in
some time period. These effects would, of course, be in addition to the
immediate multiplier types of output generated by the R&D expenditure in the
period in which the expenditure is made.
Returning to the question of the time-lag relationships between
R&D expenditures (performance) and the subsequent generation of G(R&D) ,
there are basically two lag distributions of interest. First, there is the
lag between R&D occurrence and when net contributions to output begin to be
positive--that is_ the period required to return the investment and create
the initial G(R&D) . Second, once positive net contributions appear, there
is a finite life to the stream of G(R&D) created by an R&D activity. We
explore each of these time relationships as well as their joint effect in
the following discussion.
Initial G(R&D) Lags. Quantification of this widely recognized
and discussed phenomenon has, to date, been less than satisfactory. Even
in very specific instances of technological innovations, the precision with
which the exact dates of innovation and subsequent return of investments
can be determined is suspect. Too often, innovations occur as a result of
efforts spread over many years. Recognizing when "the" innovation occurred
must, at best, be considered a judgmental decision. Schmookler,l_/ in his
study of patents and their economic impact, attempts to quantify these
relationships--and has some success. Unfortunately, his orientation focuses
on time lags between patents and subsequent marketable consumption goods.
Mansfield'/ traces the introduction of diesel locomotive power
within American railroads. His analysis suggests that significant lags
existed--on the order of 20 years--before the majority of U.S. railroads
decided to dieselize completely.
l_/ Jacob Schmookler, Invention and Economic Growth (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1966).
2_/ Edwin Mansfield, The Economics of Technological Change (New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, 1968).
39
In both of these analyses, the time lags were found to be signifi-
cant. The focus was, however, on major dramatic innovations and the time
lags are_ therefore, understandably long. Few radical changes are imple-
mented in a short time period. As we have pointed out previously, innova-
tions, when viewing a macro economic system, are many and cover a broad
spectrum of complexity. Some are insignificant when viewed next to diesel
power, computers, jet engines and the like. These minor innovations do
nevertheless generate economic return, if implemented. We assume an inno-
vation not implemented to be one not worthy (in the eyes of the decision-
maker) of application and therefore it would not even return its investment.
At the macro level the "losers" are averaged with the "winners." As we
will show, the average indicates more winners than losers.
Since innovations span a broad spectrum in terms of technical
significance or complexity (fromatomic power plants to the "Hula-Hoop"),
it seems reasonable that the rate at which these innovations are implemented
varies as well. From a purely pragmatic standpoint, it is conceivable that
some innovations can be conceived, developed, implemented, return their
original investment, generate positive contributions to G(R&D) and dis-
appear all within the same calendar year. The "Hula-Hoop" is a notable
example, and there are possibly thousands of others.
More complex innovations may take a considerable period before
the investment is returned. For example, in the case of electronic consumer
goods; significant product, process and marketing development efforts are
required subsequent to initial product conception. Some of these activities
will be time-consuming as well as requiring additional investment. This
would then lengthen the time lag between innovation and return of investment--
although only the R&D investment is of concern here.
Because of the sparsity of empirical data on time lags between
innovation and return of investment and the inherent difficulties in
developing these lag distributions at the macro level, we have approached
the problem of obtaining this distribution by another means. Best estimates,
most likely, come from individuals involved in R&D management on a con-
tinuing basis. These would be U.S. corporations which engage in R&D activi-
ties to ensure continued economic viability and market shares in a competi-
tive environment. Estimates by responsible individuals from a cross-section
of industry should yield a highly credible quantitative lag distribution.
However, few of these data are available. There is one notable exception--
the McGraw-Hill survey, :'Business' Plans for New Plam_s and Equipment."
McGraw-Hill Survey. The McGraw-Hill Departmsnt of Economics
has been conducting surveys of planned expenditures for research and develop-
ment performed by business since 1956. Table Ii indicates the percent of
total employment accounted for in the 1956 survey. As stated by Greenwald
4O
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(Table II source), "Our sample does include almost every large company in
United States industrial and commercial fields. " The ].968 Survey included
some 900 companies accounting for an estimated 80 percent of all U.S. R&D
performance and distributed by industries essentially as the 1956 data
indic ate.
TABLE ii
PERCENT OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT ACCOUNTED
FOR IN MCGRAW-HILL SURVEY_ BY IEDt_TRY_ 19S8_/
Industry
Percent of
Total _nployment
Accounted for by
Survey Respondents
Primary metals
Machinery
Electrical equipment
Aircraft and parts
Fabricated metals and ordnance
Professional and scientific instruments
Chemicals
Paper
Rubber
Stone, clay, and glass
Petroleum
Food
Textiles and apparel
Other manufacturing
Total manufacturing
Nonmanufacturing
All industries
68
44
66
55
, 55
21
75
31
65
50
85
55
lO
29
58
21
5O
a_/ Based on the ratio of employment in the McGraw-Hill sample of
companies relative to total employment in each industry according
to the data from the survey conducted for the National Science
Foundation by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of
Labor.
Source: Greenwald, Douglas_ "The Annual McGraw-Hill Research and Development
Survey," Methodology of Statistics on Research and Development
(NSF 59-56; june, 1959).
One of the questions in the R&_ portion of the survey is, "How
soon do you expect your exq0enditures on research and development to pay
off?" The 1968 responses to this question are tabulated below:
Percent of
Companies Responding
2 years or less
S years or less
9 years or less
i0 years or more
19
90
96
Since the federal government supplies industry with over half
the funds for R&Dperformed for industry_ it is worth noting that the
pay-back expectations must reflect a mix of time estimates for both
government and private projects.
Because the data were grouped in intervals_ we have approximated
the distribution of responses by a Poisson distribution with a mean of three
years. The probability_ Pi , that payoff occurs i years after the R&D
activity occurs is shown in Table 12 for each year-lag.
TABLE 12
Years Lag After R&D
(i)
Probability that Payoff Occurs in Year i
(Pi)
0 0.05
1 0.15
2 : 0.22
5 0.22
& 0.17
5 0 .i0
6 0.05
7 0.02
Assuming that "payoff" means "return of investment3" the lag
distribution above gives the probability that net positive contributions
to G(R&D) begin for each year after the R&D activity. The distribution
shows that G(R&D) is least likely to occur soon or long after R&D. The
most likely years for iritial G(R&D) are in the two to four year lag
periods.
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Once R&D has recovered its investment and Legins to generate
a stream of G(R&D), positive contributions to output over those expected
as a result of labor and capital inputs continue. They do notj however,
continue ad infinitum. The following section explores the lifetime
characteristics of G(R&D).
Lifetime Distribution. Having developed a distribution of
lag between R&D and initial G(R&D), it is necessary to describe the
length of time that contributions to G(R&D) are expected to occur.
Research in this aspect of the process is essentially non-existent.
There does, however, exist a quantitative basis for the development of a
lifetime distribution based on research performed by Stanford Research
Institute (SRI) as special studies in its Long Range Planning Service.
In two studies performed by SRI in 1965. characteristics of
growth productsl_/and timing of "top-out" in growth products[/were
analyzed. The first of these studies indicated that of the products
with high growth rates (greater than 6 percent per annum) during the
1957-1962 period, 84 percent of consumer goods had at least average
technological and engineering requirements. Of the nonconsumer growth
products, 12 percent had high technological and engineering r_qulrements
and 86 percent had average requirements. That is, no less than 98 per-
cent of the nonconsumer growth products studied had at least average
technological and engineering requirements. Because of the high tech-
nological requirements, it can be assumed that high R&D requirements
existed for these products as well.
In "Top-Out in Growth Products," research done by SRI indicated
that, on the average, sales in these products stopped growing (topped-
out) approximately four years after introduction. Company responses to a
survey indicated that 52 percent of the companies reduced prices--and,
thereby, economic output and gains in output as previously described--
after top-out occurred. In addition, 57 percent of the companies indi-
cated that they changed the variety of the product line--usually additions--
to off-set the decline in sales of growth products. The most often pursued
course of action to counteract top-out was to improve the quality of the product.
_/ Douglas A. Hurd, "Characteristics of Growth I_oducts," Long Range Planning
Service (Menlo Park, California: Stanford _eseareh Institute, 1965).
2/ John A. Butler, "Top-0ut in Growth Products," Lo_ng Range P!anning
Service (Menlo Park, California: Stanford Research Institute, 1965).
4_
]In effect, counter-measures to top-out were to:
* reduce prices_
* create new products_
* improve the old product,
the last two of these requiring technological inputs.
It is assumed that high growth rate products result from the
development and application of technological knowledge which in turn is
increased through R&D activity. Moreover, it is assumed that the time
to top-out of growth products typifies the average life of the G(R&D)
stream created by R&D results. Recognizing that not all life-times will
be exactly four year% it is assumed that a Poisson distribution with a
mean of four years will describe the probability of the lifetimes other
than four years in length of G(R&D) streams. Figure 4 illustrates the
distribution.
The distribution indicates that there is a small probability that
the lifetime will be zero to one year as well as eight or more years. In
addition, the lifetime will be less than seven years with a probability of
approximately 0.9. Table 15 is a tabular presentation of the individual
yearly probabilities for the lifetime distribution.
TABLE 13
G(R&D). LIFETT_ME DISTRIBUTION
!
!
]
!
1
1
Q
Years of G(R&D) Lifetime Lifetime Probability
0 0.0185
i 0.0735-
2 0.1465
3 0.1954
4 0.1954
5 0.1565
6 0.1042
7 0.0595
8 0.0298
9 0.0132
i0 0.0055
ll 0.0019
l
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G(R&D) Generation Pattern. With the lag and lifetime distri-
butions developed, the combined effect of these distributions can be
utilized to describe the stream of contributions to G(R&D). The process
of combining these two time relationships will reflect that there is a
finite probability associated with the starting time of G(R&D) as well
as the probabilistic characteristics of the life of the G(R&D) stream.
In statistical terminology, the Joint distribution will be a convolution
of the lag and lifetime distributions. Appendix D describes the _the-
matieal procedure for the convolution process.
]
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Figure 5 is a graphical representation of the distribution
obtained by convoluting the lag and lifetime distributions. The height
of each bar represents the probability that R&D activity will be con-
tributing to G(R&D) in the corresponding years after the R&D activity
occurs. The distribution peaks at six and seven years and is essentially
zero after 14 years. The total time span considered is i8 years in addi-
tion to the current year. Table 14 presents the distribution in tabular
form.
]
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TABLE 14 t
_(.Rm) az_zo_r PA_ _
Year Lag
0
i
2
5
4
5
6
7
8
9
i0
ii
12
15
14
IS
16
17
18
0.OO0911
0.006584
0.022546
0.0521S6
0.091255
0.127721
0.149005
0.148995
0.150216
0.100746
0.069569
0.045118
0.024060
0.012084
0.005454
0.002162
0.000744
0.000210
0.000041
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One interpretation of this distribution is that the yearly
probabilities represent fractions of total G(R&D) contributions occurring
in each of the years after R&D is performed. That is, all returns from R&D
will occur within an 18-year period and approximately 75 percent of the re-
turn will occur within eight years. We will pursue this interpretation
further in the next section.
The Relationship Between R&D and G(R&D). As we have demonstrated
previously, a sizable portion of the increases in output due to technological
progress is in fact due to the largest single determinant of technological
progress--research and development. Gains in output due to R&D--which we
denote G(R&D)--is in a strict cause-effect relationship with R&D. In this
section, we describe the quantitative relationships between R&D and G(R&D).
We hypothesize a model in which the R&D causing G(R&D) in any
time period t is given by the weighted sum of past R&D performance. The
weights used are the corresponding probabilities from the G(R&D) genera-
tion distribution. Mathematically, the model is as shown below:
Rt = wort_ 0 + wlrt_ I + w2rt_ 2 + ... + wirt_ i ... + wlsrt_8 (i)
where
R t = weighted sum of past R&D expenditures for year
w i = weight for the ith year lag, and
rt_ i = R&D expenditures in year t-i .
t ,
Then, R t is a reflection of the current year's R&D activity plus the ex-
pected value of each of the past 18 years of R&D expenditures. Conceptually,
Rt could be the effective investment in R&D "at work" in year t
Further, it is hypothesized that Rt is creating the G(R&D)
observed at time t . That is,
G(R&D)t = f(Rt) . (2)
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The functional relationship in Eq. 2 is further assumed to be a linear
function of the form
G(R&D)t -- a + bR t (3)
where
a and b are parameters to be empirically determined. I-/
Using simple least-squares regression, we have estimated the
parameters in (3) for the U.S. private nonfarm economy. The series for
G(R&D)t used was developed in Chapter VII for the years 1949 through 1968.
The years 1955-1968 were selected for analysis because of the 18-year R&D
series lead time required as a consequence of how Rt is calculated. Data
for R&D expenditures do not exist (with reliability) much earlier than 1937,
the first year in our series for R&D expenditures. The R&D series repre-
sents total annual U.S. R&Dperformance. Details of data used in the re-
gression analysis are contained in Appendix E. The results of the r@gression
are that
G(R&D)t = -4,9SA + 7.23 Rt .
.
The index of determination (R2) is 0.970, indicating that 97 percent of
variation in G(R&D)t is explained by variations in R t .
In simplest terms, the findings of this regression analysis indi-
cate that the average dollar spent on R&D returns approximately $7.23 to
the nation in the form of economic gains through technological progress, and
that the return is obtained throughout an 18-yeam period. The discounted
rate of return is 33 percent annually.2_/
Figure 6 graphically shows the relationship between G(R&D)t , at
any time t , and Rt --the weighted sum of past R&D. An interesting ob-
servation that can be made is the negative intercept on the G(R&D)t axis.
This indicates that unless Rt is at least $685 million, negative contri-
butions to G(R&D) will occur. Conceptually, this would indicate a minimum
R&D investment for continued positive contributions to G(R&D) .
This is the genera_ form of a straight line where a is the y-intercept
and b is the slope of the line.
The rate of return calculations utilize the net cash flow series and
standard engineering economics methodology for calculating discounted
cash flow rate of returns as described, for example, in Norman Barish,
Economic Analysi_ for Engineerin G and Managerial Decision-Making
(New York, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), pp. 147-172. Also see
Appendix F.
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IX. TH_ ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NASA R&D ACTIVITIES
As we have previously indicated, one of the objectives of this
research is to develop measures of the economic impact of NASA research
and development activities. In this chapter, we will develop the NASA
specific economic impact measures.
Up to this point, it has been shown that, on the average, there
is an incremental addition of $7.23 to G(R&D) for each dollar spent on
R&D. Further, we have shown that this return occurs over an 18-year period
after the R&D is performed. It should be clear that the analysis and re-
sults represent the "typical"or average situation and, therefore, those
R&D activities with higher than the average return are grouped with those
of lower than the average return.
If, for the moment, it is assumed that some particular R&D
activity is "typical," the models empirically developed in the previous
chapter can be used to perform a projection of future long-run economic
impact. That is, the expected G(R&D) stream arising from s_n R&D expendi-
ture, or series of expenditures, can be brought forward. The methodology
for a series of R&D exTenditures will require the summation of time phased
G(R&D) contributions arising from each R&D expenditure. Mathematically,
the C[R&D) stream for an R&D expenditure in year t is given by:
G(R&D)t+i : 7.2Z wir t i = 0,i,2,...,18
where
G(R&D)t+i = contribution to
R&D in year t ,
w i = weighting factor for
G in year t+i arising from
ith year from G(R&D)
generation pattern; and
rt = R&D expenditure in year t .
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The annual G(R&D)j , where j = t+i , resulting from a time series of R&D
expenditures beginning in year t I and ending in year t 2 would be
J
G(R&D)j : 7.23
l
!
I
_- w_ rk J = tl,...,t 2 q
k=t I J
where:
= j - k , and
fw_ if 0 _ _ _ 18
W_ \ootherwise
The annual G(R&D)j can then be summed to provide the cumulative impact of
a series of R&D expenditures.
The NASA R&D Impact. Under the assumption that R&D expenditures
by NASA are no better than typical_ we have applied the methodology above to
the NASA R&D series for 1959 through 1969.1_/ The results of the computations
are presented in tabular form in Table i$ in current dollars and Table 16 in
constant 1958 dollars as deflated by the GN? deflator for the 1959 through
1969 input series. It should be noted that these extrapolations do not
reflect any future effects of inflation.
In Table 15, it can be seen that the $130 million of R&Dper-
formed in 1959 yields a G(R&D) stream of $i, 6, 21, etc., million be-
ginning in 1959. The quantity for 1976--the eighteenth year beyond 1958--
is not shown due to rounding. This stream is observed by reading down the
1959 column. Similarly, the 1960 expenditure of $363 million generates a
stream beginning in 1960 and ending in 1977 and so on. It can be readily
noted that any R&D expenditure will not create G(R&D) in a prior year nor
after the eighteenth year after the expenditure by observing the bl_nks in
the table.
The total row at the bottom of the table indicates the total
impact on G(R&D) resulting from any year's R&D expenditure. The total
in a column will be 7.23 (0.9871) = 7.137 times the R&D expenditure. The
0.9871 is the cumulative of the generation distribution through 18 years.
That is, we have ignoled 1.3 percent of the theoretical distribution which
occurs after 18 years to simplify the analysis.
g Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963.
(Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1966), and private communication frem
Charles M. Hochberg, June A, 1970.
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The total column represents the slznmation of G(R&D) contribu-
tions from each of the year's R&D expenditures. In effect, it represents
a yearly look at the sources of G(R&D) . For example, in 1959, G(R&D)
is totally due to the 1959 expenditure appropriately weighted. However,
in 1962, G(R&D) is made up of shares from 1959, 1960, 1961, and 1962 as
shown in the 1962 row of Tables 15 and 16.
The cumulative total column gives the sum of the annual G(R&D)
totals for any point in time. This then gives the total impact due to the
expenditure series at any point in time.
Analysis of the tables discloses the following:
* The $29 billion spent on R&Dby NASA during the 1959-1969
period will yield a positive contribution to G(R&D) of $207 billion
through 1987.
* Through 1970, the 1959-1969 R&D expenditures by NASA have gen-
erated a G(R&D) of $56 billion or 1.95 times the original expenditure.
* Similar results follow from analysis of the 1958 constant
dollar table. /
Numerous other results can be gleaned from the tabular results. To further
illustrate the flows of G(R&D) , we have depicted the distributions of
flows resulting from each year's R&D in a time sequenced relationship in
Figure 7. Summation of the ordinates for each curve would yield the totals
as shown in the next to last column in Table 15. As is readily apparent
from Figure 7, the generation process, when a series of R&D expenditures
is involved, is complex.
In order to further analyze the economic impact of the NASA R&D
expenditures, we have calculated the ne___tflow for the 1959 through 1987
period by discounting annual G(R&D) by the R&D expenditure in the same
year. Figure 8 illustrates the net flow. Performing a rate of return
calculation on this series yields an annual discounted rate of return of
33 percent.l-/
How Typical is NASA? The analysis of the preceding section
depends upon a critical assumption--NASA R&D expenditures generate the
same G(R&D) stream as the average R&D expenditure. In this section, we
show that this is a conservative assumption and tha_&the G(R&D) stream
created by NASAR&D should, in fact, be higher than the average.
See Appendix F for complete discussion of rate of return calculations.
55
9g
-I,o I 1 I I
G (R&D)
i i I I I I I
0
Z
z
9
|
H
r_
_on rj
! V
!
I
]
.i
SNOIqlI£ NI MO7::I 13N
I
cO
w
>" "r_
57
In order to obtain quantitative estimates of how non-typical the
NASA R&D returns may be, an industry level analysis of technological prog-
ress was performed. The analysis consisted of applying the Solow method-
ology to each two-digit SIC code manufacturing industry and all manufacturing
for the period 1949-1967. The methodology, data, and detailed results are
included in Appendix G. Table 17 shows the level of technology, At ,
being applied in 1966 for each industry. It can be seen that the manu-
facturing sector has a wide range of At among the two-digit industries.
Since At can be interpreted as the technology multiplier; that
is, output is equal to total factor inputs times At , it is readily evident
that resources allocated to one industry can have significantly different
"leverage" than in another industry. Output is then clearly a function of
the mix of expenditures by industry. From Table 17, the total inputs into
the manufacturing sector yielded an average technology multiplier of 1.4531
in 1966 relative to the 1949 technology level. In other words, every
dollar, distributed according to the 1966 expenditure pattern, yielded
$1.43 output or $.43 more than would have been experienced in 1949. Analysis
of alternate spending distributions could, within limits, be used to investi-
gate relative multiplier effects.
l
]
!
!
l
]
]
.
Based on the 1966 mix of NASA spending levels in the manufacturing
industry, an analysis of technological leverage obtained by the NASA spending
pattern is possible. Table 18 is an analysis of fractions of total NASA
expenditures going to those industries NASA primarily dealt with. The weighted
At resulting from the manufacturing sectcr expenditures is 2.122, indicating
a si_lificant!y higher multiplier than the total U.S. economy spending
pattern in the manufacturing sector in 1966. One is led to the inevitable
conclusion that the pattern in which NASA resources are distributed leads
to significantly higher applied At and, therefore, a significantly higher
G(R&D) than the average spending pattern.
The foregoing conclusion is only an indication that the return
from NASA is higher than the average and attempts to interpret quantitative
differences should be handled with caution. The reasons for this are mani-
fold. Some are:
]
]
]
]
precise At
1
estimates.
The Solow methodology does not have _Lll applicability for
calculations at the industry level.
Data at the industry level require numerous assumptions and
3. The wei_ited At is a limited attempt (consistent, however,
with the overall limitations of this analysis) to treat aggregation.
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JIn order to obtain quantitative estimates of how non-typical the
NASA R&D returns may be, an industry level analysis of technological prog-
ress was performed. The analysis consisted of applying the Solow method-
ology to each two-digit SIC code manufacturing industry and all manufacturing
for the period 1949-1967. The methodology, data, and detailed results are
included in Appendix G. Table 17 shows the level of technology, At ,
being applied in 1966 for each industry. It can be seen that the manu-
facturing sector has a wide range of At among the two-digit industries.
Since At can be interpreted as the technology multiplier; that
is, output is equal to total factor inputs times At , it is readily evident
that resources allocated to one industry can have significantly different
"leverage" than in another industry. Output is then clearly a function of
the mix of expenditures by industry. From Table 17, the total inputs into
the manufacturing sector yielded an average technology multiplier of 1.4531
in 1966 relative to the 1949 technology level. In other words, every
dollar, distributed according to the 1966 expenditure pattern, yielded
$1.43 output or $.43 more than would have been experienced in 1949. Analysis
of alternate spending distributions could, within limits, be used to investi-
gate relative multiplier effects.
1
1
]
1
l
1
1
|
Based on the 1966 mix of NASA spending levels in the manufacturing
industry, an analysis of technological leverage obtained by the NASA spending
pattern is possible. Table 18 is an analysis of fractions of total NASA
expenditures going to those industries NASA primarily dealt with. _ne weighted
At resulting from the manufacturing sector expenditures is 2.122, indicating
a si_ificant!y higher multiplier than the total U.S. economy spending
pattern in the manufacturing sector in 1966. One is led to the inevitable
conclusion that the pattern in which NASA resources are distributed leads
to significantly higher applied A t and, therefore, a significantly higher
G(R&D) than the average spending pattern.
The foregoing conclusion is only an indication that the return
from NASA is higher than the average and attempts to interpret quantitative
differences should be handled with caution. The reasons for this are mani-
fold. Some are:
]
]
]
]
lo
precise At
.
estimates.
The Solow methodology does not have full applicability for
calculations at the industry level.
Data at the industry level require n_erous assumptions and
]
]
3. The weighted A t is a limited attempt (consistent, however,
with the overall limitations of this analysis) to trBat aggregation.
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SIC
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
Total Manufacturing
NASA
TABLE 17
1988 INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY LEVELS
Food and kindred
Tobacco
Textiles
Apparel
Lumber and wood
Furniture
Paper and allied
Printing
Chemicals
Petroleum refinlng
Rubber and plastics
Leather
Stone, clay and glass
Primary metals
Fabricated metal
Machinery, except electrical
Electrical machinery
T_amsportation equipment
Scientific instruments
59
A(1986)
1.5997
O. 9051
1.5338
0.9996
1.5058
l 7788
1.360&
1.5797
1.8025
1.8&03
i.2003
1.4818
i.&969
1.8502
i. 7826
2.2382
1.5580
2.1831
2.1570
1.4331
2.1_24,
SIC
192
Rest of 19
3722
3721 & 3729
5721 & 5722
Rest of 37
27
28
29
30
33
34
357
Rest of 35
566
Rest of 36
38
Total
TABLE 18
FISCAL YEAR 1966 NASA EXP_[DITURES
Expenditure Percent
($000) of Total
1,330,795 52.1
7,602 0.19
485,899 11.7
1,4_2,&67 3_.8
143,550 3.5
6,571 0.16
2,853 0.07
96,054 2.3
1,727 0.04
2,4_ 0.06
4,038 0.I0
15,248 0._0
206,114 5.Q
18,642 0.45
516,712 7.6
35,644 0.87
27t00_ 0.66
4,143,364 i00.0
J
1
1
1
1
1
1
]
!1
J
1
Source : Lloyd D. Orr and David Jones, An Industry Breakdown of _SA
Expenditures, Indiama University, Bloomington, Indiana,
November 1969.
]
]
]
]
]
]
6O
In spite of these limitations, it is clearly evident that the
NASA economic impacts quantified in this research do, in the worst case,
represent absolute lower bounds. Extensive further research is required
to improve the precision of these results.
Two potential areas for additional research, consistent with the
basic approach pursued above, are:
i. More definite assessments of industry level technological
progress through the use of more complex production functions--e.g., CES
or VES forms--and refined data on capital in existence, utilization rates,
value added deflators, etc. It should be noted that both the model and
data warrant simultaneous improvement to preclude inconsistencies in reli-
ability of these two aspects of the assessment process.
2. Refinement of the aggregation procedure used to determine the
economic leverage resulting from a real or hypothetical spending pattern.
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APPENDIXA
TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
BASIC CONCEPTS AND REVi_ OF RECENT RESEARCH
i. TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOU_
Technological change has long been recognized as one of the
dynamic factors in economic growth, but only in recent years has it been
considered of outstanding importance, and only recently have attempts been
made to measure its impact.
Technological Progress in Economic Theory
Most of the past economists recognized the existence of techno-
logical change, and mentioned it as a factor in their dynamic economic
models. However, it was usually considered of secondary importance com-
pared to capital accumulation, and its dynamic effects were more often
viewed as an explanatory variable in business cycles than as a factor con-
tributing to long term economic growth. ./
The view of Adam Smith was that the primary source of growth was
capital accumulation, and secondarily an improved division of labor. But
he did suggest that a link between these factors and technological change
did exist. According to Smith the "measured" sources of growth were as
follows:
The annual produce of the land and labour of any
nation can be increased in its value by no other
means, but by increasing either the number of its
productive labourers, or the productive powers of
those labourers.l--/
However, the reason why labor inputs would be increased was an increase in
capital. The sources of increased labor productivity were an improved
division of labor, or "Some addition and improvement to those machines and
instruments which facilitate and abridge labour."2-/ This does indicate the
i_/ Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nation s (N. Y.: The Modern Library, 1937), p. 326.
2/ Ibi_____dd.,p. 526. Smith also indicated that the division of labor was a
factor which contributed to technical progress, for workers saw where
improvements coltld be made. Again_ he did consider only improvements
in machinery.
A-1
]awareness of technological progress, but of a kind restricted to improve-
ments embodied in new machinery. And, it was of decidedly secondary impor-
tance as a growth factor, with the emphasis being on capital accumulation
as summarized in the following statement.
When we compare, therefore, the state of a nation
at two different periods, and find, that the annual
produce of its land and labour is evidently greater
at the latter than at the former...we may be assured
that its capital must have increased during the
interval • • .i_/
Ricardo also discussed the growth potential of technological
change, and like Smith emphasized improvements in machinery. In fact,
his discussion of technical change is restricted almost entirely to a
chapter entitled "Machinery."2-- / In that chapter he argues that "the dis-
covery and useful application of machinery always leads to the increase
of the net produce of the country."3_/ However, he did feel that the gross
product could be diminished, and implied that a major impact of technical
change is likely to be on income distribution.
1
1
]
]
1
]
]
|
.the employment of machinery is frequently detri-
mental to their Ethe labouring class] interests. A_/
Even Malthus, who, it is commonly viewed, overlooked technical
progress in making his gloonrg predictions regarding the increase of food
and population, realized the existence of this source of growth. However,
such a factor did not deter his conclusion for he believed that improve-
ments in machinery occurred only in response to demand, and the effect on
the supply of output would never outrun the increase in demand, but would
serve only to stave off some lower level of subsistence.5_/
Teqhnological progress was also mentioned by any number of earlier
economists,6_/ but most never believed it to be of any great consequence,
particularly as it might affect the output of an industry or a nation. The
emphasis was on improvements in machinery that were labor-saving. As such
]
]
]
]
l/ Ibid., p. 526.
2_/ David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Econonrf and Taxation (N. Y.:
Everyman's Libra_ F, 19A8), Ch. XXXI.
3_/ Ibid., p. 267.
4/ Ibid.
5_/ Thomas R. Malthus, Principles of Political Econo_, 2nd ed. (London:
William Pickerimg, 1936), pp. S09-413.
6/ Including Marshall, Mill, and a host of lesser kno_:n economists such
as Condorcet and _dwin.
A-2
]
]
the effects were viewed as affecting income distribution more than growth
of output. The opinions were mixed, of course, some viewing such tech-
nical change as easing the burden of labor, while others viewed it as
damaging to the laboring class. On this latter side we must of course
mention Marx who believed that technical change was the response of
capitalists to declining profit rates, and as such would serve to create
an arr_F of technologically unemployed.
Perhaps the only economist of stature to discuss at any length
what we now call technological progress is Joseph Schumpeter. Schumpeter
was primarily concerned with the dynamic forces in the economy and devoted
his works to such discussion. To him the area of economic analysis requir-
ing work was that explaining changes in the parameters of the system, which
meant the economy had been redirected toward a different equilibrium posi-
tion. He viewed this as economic development, and in his explanation of
such economic change the entrepreneur and innovator, and of necessity the
innovations, were essential.l- /
But, for the most part, economists have treated technology as a
parameter and examined the short-run features of a system constrained by
a level of technology. In comparative static analysis some attention has
been devoted to the consequences of a change in the level of technology.
In the very recent past, however, with developments occurring in a sector
of economics entitled growth theory, more attention has been given to tech-
nological progress. In part, the recent attempts at measuring the aggregate
effect of technological change spring from the developments in the use of
the aggregate production function in growth theory.
Technological Progress In Economic History
While theorists discussed the role of technical change they
rarely gave it an important place. Economic historians, however, in dis-
cussing the industrial revolution, or the take-off, and in trying to ex-
plain long-term economic growth, necessarily gave greater emphasis to
technological change than did the theorists. However, technological change
has never been precisely defined in its fullest meaning, and measurement
of the impact of such change has never been in terms of all its attributes.
I_/ See his following works, The Theory of Economic Development (N. Y.:
Oxford University Press, 1961); Ca?italism_ _ocialism and Democracy
(N. Y°: Harper and Row Publishers, Ine.--Hazper Torch Book Edition,
1962); Business Cycles (N. Y.: McGraw-Hill, 196_).
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The earliest approaches to assessing the role of tec[mo!ogical
change, other than the minimumdiscussion of Smith or Marshall, defined
and explained the industrial revolution in England.J/ For the most part,
this consisted of cataloguing the detailed changes that had occurred in
the technology of several industries crucial to the revolution. Researchers
traced the origins and consequencesof the development of the steam engine
and of the series of advances in the textile and metal working industries.
However, the impact of these changeswas never well measured. The growth
of the industries involved was documented, the success of some prominent
individuals was described, and the potential reduction in labor inputs was
often suggested.2_/ But, it was never proven how much of the industry's
growth was attributable to new techno!ogy. It was not always shown that
the labor savings actually occurred, and were greater than the capital
costs. And, the impact in one industry was only obliquely assessed in
terms of the entire economy.
This approach has not been entirely abandoned. It has, however,
been augmented by studies which try to more precisely measure the economic
consequences. Until only quite recently, however, the measurements were
confined to the impact in particular industries, although several researchers
tried to survey the advances in an entire industrial sector.5_/ For example,
Clark cites many advances in manufacturing, and gives a specific measure of
its effect in that industry or firm. ;
Meanwhile improvements in printing machinery helped to
promote the consumption of paper. . During the war
a Pittsburgh inventor perfected a press into which
paper was fed continuously from a large roll, and
which printed both sides simultaneously at the rate
of 9,000 sheets per hour. (Vol. II, p. 155.)
i_/ See for example, Paul Mantoux, The Industrial Revolution in the
Ei6hteenth Century (N. Y.: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc.--
Harper Torch Book Edition, 1962); John H. Clapham, An Economic
History of Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1926-38), 3 Vols.; or more recent works, P. Deane, The First
Industrial Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965);
T. S. Ashton, The Industrial Revolution (London: Oxford University
Press, 1960).
2_/ The sociological and political consequences were also discussed.
3_/ See for example, '[. S. Clark, Histor 7 of Manufactures in the United
States (Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington,
1918), Vols. i, 2, and 5; or Leo Rogin, The Introduction of Farm
Machinery in Its Relation to the Productivity_rof Labor in the
Agricu.lttlre of _he United States Durin_ the Nineteenth Centur_
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California _ress_ 1951).
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• . .by 1875 power mules had almost entirely replaced
(the self operating jack). The result was to lower
the cost of spinning and to increase the output per
spindle by one half...(Vol. II, p. ll2).
Much of the work on specific inventions or industries suffers
from a failure to deal with all the other changes that were occurring,
and therefore may have attributed to technology some consequences that
perhaps derived from other factors.
More recent work has tried to eliminate the effects of these
other factors, and thereby arrive at a more precise measure of the impact
of technological change, and determine its relative importance. William
Parker and Judith Klein have sorted out the effects of several variables
on the course of output _er worker in grain production in the United States
between 1840 and 1910.1_/ In a very detailed way, they assessed the effect
of the shifting location of production, primarily the westward movement,
from that of technological change. They concluded from analyzing the
remaining productivity gains that "mechanization was the strongest direct
cause of the productivity growth in the production of these grains."_/
Similar studies have been conducted for other industries, and industrial
sectors, and with few exqeptions reach the conclusion that technological
progress was important.S-/ The exceptions are typically in the service
industries, and here one finds that the productivity of the classical
factors of production is increasing, but often because the consumer is doing
more work.___
l/ William Parker and Judith Klein, "Productivity Growth in Grain Production
in the United States, 1840-60 and 1900-10," in Output, Employment
and Productivity in the United States After 1800 (New York: National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1966).
2_/ Ibid., p. 545.
5/ Even some exceptions can be viewed as technical progress. The major
source of increased output per worker in dairying during the Nineteenth
Century was an increase in the annual output per cow. This increase
was not due to new technology, but primarily to the diffusion of existing
technology. Some people, however, view diffusion as part of the process
of technological change. See F. Bateman, "Improvement in American
Dairy Farming, 1850-1910: A Quantitative Analysis," and "Labor Inputs
and Productivity in American Dairy Agriculture, 1850-1910," in Journal
of Economic Hi_tory, Volumes XXVII and XXIX.
_/ David Schwartzman, "The Growth of Sales per Man-Hour in Retail Trade,
1929-196Z," in ,I. Fuchs, ed., Production and Productivity in the
Service Industr[ (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research,
&969 ).
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Most of this work, while an improvement in measuring technological
change and assessing its relative importance in explaining productivity
growth, failed to relate the change within an industry to growth in the
entire economy. Recent analysis of technological change focuses on this
aspect of its consequences. This final approach has developed along with
advances in the body of economic theory and econometrics.
The Changing Concept of Technological Change
From this brief review of technological change as an explanatory
variable of long-term economic change, we can see that the concept has
undergone revision and expansion. The classical economist viewed the level
of technology as being the state of the art in machine_j. Therefore,
technological change meant improvements in machinery. Explorations of the
industrial revolution were apparently guided by this concept and yielded
detailed chronologies of innovations, but little measurement of impact.
Subsequent work in economic history was concerned with measuring both the
absolute and relative effects of technological change on an industry's
output and productivity. In the course of such measurement the concept
of technological change was sharpened.
As we noted earlier, Parker and Klein estimated that ;mechaniza-
tion was the single most important source of productivity change in grain
production. But, another source of productivity chaD_e was that of non-
mechanical technological improvements. Improved variety of seeds, better
fertilizer and better knowledge regarding crop planting, harvesting and
rotation increased the yield per acre. In dairy farming, the most important
source of increased milk output per cow was the lengthening of the milking
season. Those kinds of advances are far removed from the earlier notion
of technical change which embodied scientific advances in new machinery.
This latter type, now called disembodied technical change, is less dramatic,
and its effects are perhaps less appsment in the statistical evidence.l_/
The concept of technical change has also been sharpened by re-
search which has gone beyond the dramatic inventions familiar to most people.
Early studies of the industrial revolution emphasized the role of the steam
engine, and a series of well known developments in the textile industries.
For a long time, U.S. economic historians emphasized the major innovations
In Bateman's stud_ the source of increased productivity was the diffu-
sion of this _own technique, However, at some earlier date someone
discovered that cows could be milked longer, _nd so this new tech-
nique was avail_ule to all for use without ha:ing to embody it in
new capital e_Lipment. Parker and Klein asserted that such tech-
nical change was less apparent. (op. cir., p. 543.)
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in industry. This approach, however, is naive. We know now that techno-
logical change "was really an endless sequence of improvements made by
unknown skilled and professional workers.'_/ For example, studies of
productivity advance in the U.S. textile industry after 1824 indicate that
new machines did appear and increase productivity, but they were not the
only source of productivity advance.2-_
More important_ throughout the period new refinements
were worked out in the machine shop and then were
incorporated in the latest models of the old machine.
Similar evidence has been compiled for other industries.3-/
These changes in our understanding of technical change, and an
improved understanding of theprocess by which technical advances get into
the economic system, have created difficulties in trying to assess the
impact of a particular innovation.i/
i_/ D. North, Growth and Welfare in the American Past (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
l_entice-Hall, 1966), p. IS7.
2_/ Lance Davis and H. Louis Stettler, "The New England Textile Industry,
1825-1860: Trends and Fluctuations," in _ut_Em_loyment and
Productivity in the United States After 1800 (New York: National
Bureau of Economic Research_ 1966), pp. 229-2S0.
3_/ See the following works: Thomas R. Navin, The Whiten Machine Works
Since 18SI (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 405.
Samuel Hollander, The Sources of Increased Efficiency: A Stud_ of
Du Pont Rsyon Plants (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1965). H. F. Williamson,
• "The _merican Petroleum Industry,"R L. Andreano and Carmen Menzes,
in 0ut_ut_ Employment and Productivity in the United States After
1800 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1966). Perhaps
this is an appropriate point to mention the important work of
Jacob Schmook!er, who tried to determine the rate of technical change
by examining patent records. It is thus an attempt to relate inventions
to the aggregate economy. (See, Jacob Schmookler, "The level of
Inventive Activity," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 56
(May 1954), pp. 183-190, and "Inventing and Maximizing," American
Economic Review_ 5_3 (September 1965), pp. 725-729.) His work is being
pushed in new directions by WillismNordhaus at the Cowles Foundation
for Research in Economics at Yale University.
j The difficulties of measuring the impact of a single innovation can be
compounded not only by a delay in diffusion, but by the eventual
diffusion to unrelated industries. The machine tool industry offers
evidence of the interrelationships among industries. See_ N. Rosenberg,
"The Technological Change in the Machine Tool Industry, 1840-1910,"
Journal of Economic History, 2_3 (December 1965), pp. 414-445.
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The newer aggregate production function approach overcomes some
of these problems. No attempt is madeto identify the technical advances
that occurred. By restricting enquiry to a specified time period, the
researcher need not consider the effects of diffusion that occur after
the closing date. As we noted, however, if the residual is precisely
measured in these studies, the resulting value, while often large, per-
tains only to the supply side. Thus, while it is an improvement to
rigorously quantiI_y the impact of a well defined conception of technical
change, the result is limited by such methodological precision. While
economic historians did not make a measurement of this aggregate effect,
they did develop a broader view of the meaning and impact of technological
change. A concise summary, subject to some of the refinements discussed,
is provided by Victor Clark.
Technical progress arises from the effort of industry
to enlarge production, improve products, economize
labor and materials, utilize new substances, and
produce a greater variety of articles for consumption._-#
All of these effects cannot be captured in a residual measure of
increased output. The impact of technical change falls on the demand side
of the equation as well as the simply, and bot_ the demand andsupply effects
need not result in increased output, nor be identifiable as the source of
increased output.
2. PRODUCTION THEORY
Production Function Concepts
Central to total factor productivity measurements is the concept
that productivity can be computed by using the equation:
+ 8K'
where PT = Total factor productivity,
Q = Output,
K = Capital input,
d Clark, op. ei___t.,I: p. A02.
A-8
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
II
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
1
L = Labor input, and
_,8 : Weighting factors.
This implies a production function of the form
Q = PT (OIL + BK). (1)
From a purely mathematical standpoint, this function will yield
a positive value for Q if either K or L is equal to zero. That is,
either labor or capital can yield output autonomously. This difficulty,
among others, has lea economists to construct alternative mathematical
specifications or functions which can more realistically describe the output
generating process. Before describing some of these approaches it might be
useful to explore some characteristics that a production function should
possess in light of the neoclassical theory of production.
As Murray Brown I-/ has pointed out, a minimal set of three criteria
must be satisfied. First, the marginal products of factors must be positive.
That is,
-;
8Q >0 and
_K
This criterion is met by (i) in that:
3Q and
B--K = 8PT
The second criterion requires that, over a relevant range, each
marginal product should decrease when labor and capital increase. Symboli-
cally, this requires that r
i_/ Murray Brown, On the Theory and Measurement of Technological Change
(N. Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1968).
A-9
<0 ,
For (i), the criterion is not met in that
= 0 and
8_L2 =0 .
Conceptually, the marginal products do not change through ranges of K and
L.
Third, a production function should not determine economies of
scale on an s, priori basis. From a mathematical standpoint, the function
should be capable of assuming any degree of homogeneity empirically
dictated. A production function is homogeneous of degree n if and on/y if
In the case of (1),
f(kL,),,K) = knf(L,K) •
I
q = PT E_(xr) + _(_)] - _PT(_T + pi)
and therefore, (i) is homogeneous of degree ! which implies constant returns
to scale. Hence, the production function implicit in productivity measure-
ments fails two of the three neoclassical requirements.
Production functions that do satisfy the requirements have been
constructed and empirically investigated. The most famous and widely used
function is attributed to Cobb and Douglas.l-/ The Cobb-Douglas function
is of the form
Q p_,KB (2)
Brown shows that this function satisfies the three criteria outlined above
if _ and _ are independently determined. That is, if 1 - _ = B is
l_/ See Brown, op. cit_____.,for more extensive diseussio_ of the Cobb-Douglas
function.
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not required to hold--which would fix economies of scale at unity since
(2) is homogeneous of degree _ + 6. Nevertheless, there is an inherent
difficulty with (2).
Without becoming entangled in difficult mathematics here, let us
merely state that it can be shown that (2) has an elasticity of substitution
of labor for capital equal to one for all empirically developed values for
and _ From a conceptual standpoint, this can be interpreted to mean
that relative shares of income to capital and labor are constant for any
changes in the relative supplies of labor and capital. This is a famous
property of the Cobb-Douglas function and one that has precipitated the de-
velopment of production functions that do not possess this property. These
are referred to as "constant elasticity of substitution," (CES) and "vari-
able elasticity of substitution," (VES) functions. These improved functions
are more important in inter-industry comparisons than in aggregate analysis.
More important, empirical results show that with the CES functions, empiri-
cally developed elasticity of substitution is close to one for the U.S.
econo_.l--/
The Residual
The major obvious difference between (!) and (2)--and the more
complex production functions for that matter--is that the factors of labor
and capital are multiplicative rather than additive. They all have, in one
form or another, the multiplier PT This is referred to as either total
factor productivity or alternatively as the "index of technology" or the
"residual." Irrespective of the terminology, PT compensates for ar_v
variations of true output from that calculated by the production function
or source data for an index number computation. We will refer to it as
the residual.
The residual measures the output not explained or caused by the
Inputs--that is, in the way the inputs are said to interact /nd contribute
to output as specified by the production function used to calculate PT
and also based on the data series for the inputs.
Brown, op. cit., includes work by him and DeCani that yields essentially
the same results in aggregate analysis when comparing a CES and Cobb-
Douglas model. Lester Lave cites work by Nelson, which led to similar
results in Tc_chnolo_ical Chan_e: Its Conce2tion and Measurement
(Englewood C7.).ffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, !966).
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The production function of the form:
where we have replaced PT with a more general productivity component, P ,
can take on a number of functional forms. This is primarily because of the
flexibility that the state of the art allows.
Depending on whether the increases in productivity are felt to
be exogenous to capital and labor inputs or endogenous to them, (3) will
take on the following forms, respectively:
or
Q - p_ f(_,_)
Q : P_'_fl (P_/'),% (PK,K)] -(5)
n
In (_), the assumption is that increases in productivity are disembodied
and in (G) the pure labor and capital series are "adjusted" to reflect
embodied productivity gains. Disembodied productivity gains of PT' are
also included in (5). In either case, a man-hour of labor or a dollar of
capital is producing more or less output, as the case may be, which is re-
flected in the productivity factors of the function.
5. QUANTIFYING TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS--TWO APPROACHES
Recent literature on economic growth is liberally endowed with
both theoretical and empirical studies aimed at measuring the sources of
economic growth. Because of its widely recognized importance as such a
source, a focal point of many of these studies is technological progress.
The Task
The central question to be answered is simply how much additional
output, measured in gross national product, results from a given level of
factor inputs at some cnt point than at some earlier point in history? If
an increase in output has occurred with no increase _n factor inputs, then
productivity has advanced. Furthermore, if income per capita has increased,
then welfare has also improved, at least in general. _This advance in pro-
ductivity and welfare can be attributed to technological progress, certainly
in its broadest sense, because productivity has chazged with no direct in-
crease in either labor or capital used to generate the output.
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Two General Avenues
In quantifying the technological component of growth--that is,
growth beyond that attributable to increases in factor inputs--economists
have approached the problem from basically two fronts--through quantifica-
tion of productivity increases, as measured by an index such as output per
man hour, and through production theory models. In the former approach,
changes in productivity indexes are implicitly assumed to reflect the effect
of such external forces as technological progress. The production theorist,
on the other hand, typically attacks the problem more directly, in that he
simply defines the unexplained changes in growth as technological progress,
priori. On balance, the distinction is academic, since both approaches
treat that contribution to growth which is unexplained by changes in factor
inputs as arising from an external force which is commonly referred to as
"technological progress."
Practical Problems of Estimation
Regardless of the approach used, there are three problems of
estimation that must be recognized:
* First_ the effects of technological progress are measured
entirely by growth of output which is unexplained by change in factor in-
puts. The consequence of this, of course, is that the products of any
factor inputs that are either not specifically treated as factor inputs or
go unrecognized are simply lumped within the resultant measure labeled
technological progress.
* Second, use of gross national product (or net national product)
as a measure of output has several difficulties associated with it. Among
these is that it fails to capture some of the more important collateral
benefits of technological progress such as new or improved final products,
less expensive final products, and so on.
* Third, as Mansfield has pointed out, such gross measurements
fail to give adequate recognition to the substantial degree of interdepen-
dence among technological progress and the nontechnological or quasi-
technological factors, such as education, changes in worker health and
morale, and the like. As a result, the estimated contribution of each of
these latter factors may not be an adequate indication of the synergistic
effect on the growth rate that would actually result from additional em-
phasis on any one of them.
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Introduction to Sections A and 5 _'
In Sections A and 5, we will describe something of the methodologies,
the underlying theoretical bases, and the problems within each of the two
general approaches, and will present a representative sampling of recent re-
sults. It is not intended that this be a comprehensive review of the re-
search performed to date, nor a tutorial on the measurement of technological
progress. Rather, our objective is simply to describe more fully the lead-
ing approaches to quantification of technological growth, and indicate some
of the results obtained with each of these approaches, l-/
A. MEASURES OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS: PRODUCTMTY CHANGES
Productivity Measures
Productivity Defined. The term productivity is generally used
to denote the ratio of output to any or all inputs used in creating that
output. This brief but convenient definition will easily serve our purpose
here.
Partial Productivity Measures. Ratios such as output per man-hour
or output per dollar of capital are usually termed "partial productivity
measures." This is because partial productivity ratios do not adequately
measure overall changes in productive efficiency, since factor substitutions
which can also increase output are not necessarily differentiated. For ex-
ample, if in a given period a substitution for capital is made which in-
creases output, the labor productivity will increase for two reasons. First,
an increase in output has been occasioned by increase in capital and, second,
the substitution of capital for labor has reduced labor inputs. The effect
is a double attribution to labor productivity of the gains actually result-
ing from capital increases.2-/
Measurement by Residual--Total Factor Inputs as a Stepping Stone
To circumvent this inherent difficulty, productivity can alter-
natively be measured by use of total factor inputs, which are then sub-
tracted from total outputs to reveal a residual attributable to productivity.
l_/ For a more detailed review of the underlying literature, the reader will
find the two sources cited in footnote 3 to Chapter I, and also A. A.
Waiters, "Production and Cost Functions: .An Econometric Survey,"
ECONOMETRICA , January-Aprll 1965, of particular vzlue. For additional
theoretical background, see Murray Brown, op. eit.
2_/ See Brown, op. ci__t., C_apter 7, for theoretical investigation of pro-
ductivity ratios, their meaning, and measurement capabilities.
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Kendrickl- / has performed the most comprehensive analysis of pro-
ductivity gains in the context of total factor inputs. In general method-
ology, the work by Kendrick is not unlike the pioneering wprk by Abramowitz 2-/
and the British-American industry comparisons by Salter.5- / It is, however,
a more comprehensive look at productzvzty gains in the U. S. economy than
either of the other two works.
Fabricant_ A-/ in his "Basic Facts on Productivity Change_" has
given an excellent summary of Kendrick's work, which can be recounted as
follows:
i. Physical output per man-hour in the private economy (not in-
cluding the government sector) has grown at an average rate that appears
to be about 2._ percent per annum.
2. Comparing that output with a modified measure of labor input--
one in which a man-hour of highly paid work, such as that of a specialized
craftsman or scientist, counts for proportionately more than a man-hour of
low wage labor--yields a measure of productivity for the private economy
that grew at about 2.0 percent per annum.
5. A measure of productivity for the private economy that com-
pares output not only with labor inputs but also with tangible capital_
each factor weighted respectively by its market share, grew at about 1.7
percent per annum.
&. All of the foregoing indexes of productivity in the private
econon V rose somewhat more rapidly than the corresponding indexes for the
economy as a whole including the government sector--which rose only about
1.5 percent per annum. 5_/
i_/ John W. Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the United States (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press_ 1961).
2_/ Moses Abramowitz, "Resource and Output Trends in the United States
since 1870_" American Economic Review_ May 1956.
5_/ W. E. G. Salter, Productivity. and Technical Chan_9 ' (Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 1960).
4_/ Solomon Fabricant, "Basic Facts on Productivity Change," Occasional
Paper No. 65 (_w York: National Bureau of Economic Research_ 1959)
also publisheG in slightly condensed form in Kendrick, op. cit.
5_/ This is because_ in the government sector, input and ouput are equated,
leading to pro@uctivity equal to unity_ which then pulls down pro-
ductivity for the aggregate.
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These productivity measureswere obtained by studying the U. S.
econo_v for the period 1889-1957, measured in terms of net national product.
The aggregate output for the econow in the same period, also measured in
net national product, rose at an average annual rate of 3.5 percent. Using
the total factor inputs of paragraph 3 above, this would attribute approxi-
mately 50 percent of the growth in the U. S. economy over this time span
to increases in productivity rather than increases in total factor input.
The great bulk of these increases in productivity have, of course,
been enjoyed by consumers in the form of the goods and services for which
they have worked and saved. Moreover, this expanded productivity, coupled
with the fruits of a rising technology and material culture level, has
produced not only a larger volume and a better quality of goods and services,
but also many new or dramatically improved goods and services. Even more
importantly from a welfare standpoint, these gains of productivity have
been widely diffused, in the distributive sense. Also, real hourly earnings,
including fringe benefits of many varieties, have grown about as rapidly
as has output per man-hour. Together, then, the twin goals of diffusion
and real income gains have been met, producing what can clearly be labeled
an approximately equivalent rise in welfare, as defined in economic terms.
Other Factors Affecting Productivity Measures
Kendrick does raise a note of caution which must be borne in mind
in interpreting productivity advances, however. It is that, although
changes in total factor productivity can be initially linked to changes in
production efficiency, the underlying changes in efficiency themselves
may be a result of technological innovation, or changes in scale or output,
or changes in the rate of utilization of capacity. Hence, mere description
of the components of changing productive efficiency alone does not fully
serve to separate the causes of those changes.
This can be illustrated in a number of ways:
* Changes in the absolute volume of output is a rough but useful
general measure of an institution's success in exploiting its opportu/lities
for technical innovations.
* However, the volume of technological irunovation designed to re-
duce costs (thereby increasing productivity as measured by the "factor in-
puts" methodology described earlier) is substantially influenced by economic
conditions at a particular point in time--which in turn introduces lags into
the time series which are difficult to predict or correlate.
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* Also, over the long run, technological progress depends on
the quantity and quality of resources devoted to increasing scientific and
technical knowledge and to developing commercial applications of this
knowledge.
* As changes in scale occur, new opportunities for adapting
technological improvements to products or processes may occur. And if
industry continues to attempt to operate at the least cost or best-practice
technique, then changes in techniques are almost certain to occur.
* Productivity increases, on the other hand, are often associated
more directly with managerial alertness and flexibility in adapting the in-
creased technical knowledge brought about through the innovative process.
Synthesis
What Kendrick is saying is that it is difficult to segregate
the effects of increases in productivity or of changes in scale from pure
advances in technology. Whether such segregation is, in fact, necessary,
except to the purist, is debatable. In view of the circular nature of the
innovative process, the question is not _ike that of the chicken and the
egg. For our purposes here, it is simply sufficient to recognize that:
i. Technological progress, as measured by productivity indices,
plays a major role in raising aggregate output and per capita output.
2. Changes in productivity have in recent periods been largely
a result of changes in technology.
5. Increases in output may also be a result of changes in scale
of operation. And while changes in scale do not automatically ensure that
there will be economies of scale, changes in scale in stepping stone
fashion provide the opportunities and incentives for technological changes
which do, in turn, yield what are often superficially labeled as economies
of scale.
4. Other influences--economic conditions, quality, and quantity
of resources devoted to scientific and technical advance and application,
entrepreneurial-managerial prowess, and the like--also have a major effect
on the rate of change_ in technology and output. Indeed, the role of man-
agement and entreprene_/rship, in combination with the treble role of educa-
tion--scientific/technical, entrepreneurial, and dissemination--may constitute
a special "soft science" dimension of technology itself.
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5. MEASURESOFTECHNOLOGICALPROGRESS: SOMEPRODUCTIONFUNCTIONRESULTS
Two Introductory Notes
Focus of Section. In this section, we review a sample of recent
works in which the economic role of technological change has been quanti-
fied by use of production function derivations. Our aim is to illustrate
the essence of the approach, to indicate some of the implicit assumptions,
and to summarize the quantitative results obtained.
Concentration on _o Alternatives. There appear to be at least
three alternative ways of measuring technical progress by use of a Froduc-
tion function approach:
i. One may explicitly attempt to estimate separately all of the
factors that contribute to economic growth.
2. One may measure the residual and then disaggregate it into
its various components, one of which is technological progress. =
3. One may measure the residual and label it technological
progress in its entirety.
The first approach has been the one least attempted, iargely be-
cause of the very great amount of data required, the potential problems of
statistically spurious correlation which are implicit in separate measure-
ment, and the necessarily arbitrary assumptions that must therefore be made.
Accordingly, we will confine our review to the second and third
approaches--disaggregating the residual, and treating the residual as a
whole.
Denison's Residual Disaggregation
Denison i-/ begins his work in much the same way as Kendrick, 2-/
in that he computes productivity gains over the.period 1909-19S7 and then
calculates an index of technological progress. S-/ Denison does not stop
here, however. He proceeds to disaggregate the residual and explain the
importance of its causal factors by dividing the residual among them. Table
A-I summarizes the process.
I_/ Denison, op. cit.
2_/ Kendrick, op. cit.
5_/ However, in the strictest sense, Denison does not use a production
function of quito the same general form used by other scholars re-
viewed in this section.
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TABLE A-I
ALLOCATION OF GROWTH RATE OF REAL NATIONAL
INCOME AMONG THE SOURCES OF GROWTH
Percentage Points in
Growth Rate
1909-29 1929-57
Real national income 2.82
Increase in total inputs 2.26
Labor input (adjusted for quality) 1.53
Employment 1. ll
Hours -0.25
Effect of shorter hours on quality 0.23
Education O. 35
Increased experience and better use of women 0.06
Changes in age-sex composition of labor force 0.01
Capital input 0.73
Nonfarm residential structures 0.13
Other structures and equipment 0.&l
Inventor ie s 0.16
United States-owned assets abroad 0.02
Foreign assets in United States 0.01
Increase in output per unit of input 0.56
Restrictions against optimum use of resources n.a.
Reduced waste in agriculture n.a.
Industry shift from agriculture n.a.
Advance in knowledge n.a.
Change in lag in application of knowledge n.a.
Economies of scale--independent growth of local
markets n.a.
Economies of scale--growth of .national market 0.28
Source: Denison, op. cit.____t., Table 32, p. 266.
2.95
2. O0
1.57
i. O0
-0.53
0.55
0.67
0.ii
-0.01
0._5
0.05
0.28
0.08
0.02
0.00
0.95
-0.07
0.02
0.05
0.58
0. Ol
0.07
0.27
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Denison is careful to note that, in manyof the areas into which
he has delved, there are little or no data or previous research available.
As a result his work is a monumentalassembly of numbers, manyof which he
builds on the basis of educated guesses in order to derive even a useful
approximation.
In analyzing Table A-l, it can be seen that the residual--Denison's
"Increase in Output per Unit of Input"--accounted for approximately 20 per-
cent of the growth in total income during the 1909-1929 p_zod, and 52 per-
cent during the 1929-1957 period. Clearly, the latter period has seen a
significantly higher contribution to growth in the residual._f
In summarizing his results for 1929-1957, Denison observes that
•five sources contributed an amount equal to i01
percent of the growth rate, out of a total of 109
percent contributed by all sources making a positive
contribution. 2-/ Thesewere increased employment
(SA percent); increased education (25); increased
capital input (15); the advance of knowledge (20);
economies of scale associated with the growth of the
national market (9).
It is clear that the increases in employmentand capital input, a total of
A9 percent, fall outside the sphere of technological progress, as it is
generally viewed. Of the remaining 52 percent, a distinction as to which
can be identified as a componentof technological progress becomesmore
difficult.
As we have seen, such secondary factors as increase in education,
advance of knowledge, and economiesof scale are not always properly sepa-
rable in analysis nor discretely independent in a causal framework. Going
even a step further back in the process, the advance of knowledge is not
really independent of increased education, since the knowledge-education
cycle is essentially circular. And, since knowledge maybe a product of
experience, an advance of knowledge may itself be a result of increasing
scale of operations or activity and hence contribute to economies of scale
and also--by virtue of the addedknowledge or perspectives gained from the
larger scale--precipitate still further advances in knowledge.
Significantly, Kendrick similarly found productivity to be higher for
the period following World War I.
This is not faulty arithmetic; somesources added negative contributions
to growth--that is, retarded it.
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Accordingly, one is compelled to conclude that there is no single
mathematically or scientifically "correct" answer to the matter of residual
shares among causal factors. About all that can be said is that Denison's
work confirms the general validity of the residual approach. Beyond that,
the attempt to treat all the components of technological change as indepen-
dent causes of growth, as Denison has done, is an exciting but not wholly
satisfying approach.
Solow's A_re_ation Approach
Robert Solow's work on "Technical Change and the Aggregate Pro-
duction Function"J is possibly the most widely quoted, debated, criticized,
and imitated analys_s of the role of technological progress in growth of
the U. S. economy. 2-/ His approach follows the third of the three method-
ologies sketched previously--a direct measurement of the residual, which
r!
is then defined as a whole to be "technological progress.
Solow's results are shown in Table A-2, which also incorporates
corrections discovered by Hogan. The index of technological change rose
from i in 1909 to 1.85 in 1949, an average growth rate of I.$6 percent,
while private nonfarm output per man-hour rose at an average rate of 1.81
percent. Hence, technological progress accounted for some 86 percent of
the growth, a value somewhat higher than Kendrick's and Denison's estimates--
SO and 52 percent, respectively.
Massell's Variation
In an attempt to overcome criticisms of Solow's work, Massell _
limits the scope of his own analysis to the manufacturing sector, in hopes
of finding better data. However, Massell's results are very similar to
Solow's, in that his index rises from 1 in 1909 to 2.9 in 1955--a growth
rate of 2.34 percent per year.
i_/ Robert M. Solow, op. tit., The Review of Economics and Statistics.
2_/ See for example_ Warren Hogan, "Technical Progress and Production
Functions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 4_0 (November 1958),
pp. 407-11; Benton Massel!, "Capital Formation and Technical Change
in U. S. Manufacturing," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 4_2
(May 1960), pp. 182-88; Benton Massell_ "A Disaggregated View of
............. Technical Change," Journal of Political Economics, LXIX (December 1961),
pp. 547-57; and Lave, op. ci__t.
3_/ B. Massell, "Capital Formation and Technical Change in U. S. Manufacturing,
0_2.ci_lt.
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Percent Labor Capital Stock
Force Employed ($million)
(1) . (2)
9 91.1
0 92.8
1 90.6
2 93.0
,3 91.8
.4 83.6
5 84.5
,6 93.7
.7 94.0
_8 94.5
.9 9Z.1
._0 92.8
-_i 76.9
._2 81.7
25 92.1
-_4 88.0
_.5 91. !
__6 92.5
_7 90.0
28 90.0
29 92.5
30 88.1
31 78.2
32 67.9
35 66.5
!54 70.9
_55 75.0
t36 77.5
t57 81.0
)38 74.7
159 77.2
_40 80.6
1 86.8
42 93.6
_43 97.4
_44 98. ¢
_&5 96.5
B46 94.8
947 95.4
948 95.7
949 95.0
146 142
150 038
156 335
159 971
164 504
171 513
175 371
178 351
182 263
186 679
189 977
194.802
201.491
204324
209,964
222113
231 772
244 611
259 142
271 089
279691
289 291
289 056
282 731
270 676
262 370
257,810
254,875
257,076
259,789
257,514
258,048
262,940
270,063
269,761
265,485
261,472
258,0.51
268,84/
276,476
289,360
_;urce: Solow, op. clt__m.
Col.
TABLE A-2
DATA FOR CALCIfLATION OF A_
i x Coi. 2 In Income
(3) 34)
133
159
141
148
151
145
148
167
Share of Property Private Nonfarm Employed Capital
GNP Per Man-Hour Per Man-Hour
135 0.335
235 0.330
640 0.535
773 0.330
OIS 0.334
385 0.525
188 0.344
115 0.358
(s) (6)
$0.623 82.06
0.616 2.10
0.647 2.17
0.652 2.21
0.680 2.23
0.682 2.20
0.669 2.26
0.700 2.34
0.370 0.679 2.21
0.342 0.729 2.22
0.354 0.767 2.47
0.319 0.721 2.58
0.569 0.770 2.55
0.339 0.788 2.49
0.337 0.809 2.61
0.330 0.836 2.74
0.536 0.872 2.81
0.327 0.869 2.87
0.325 0.871 2.95
0.338 0.874 3,02
0.332 0.8@5 3.06
0.347 0.880 3.30
0.325 0.904 3.33
0.397 0.879 3.28
0.362 0.869 3.10
0.355 0.921 3.00
0.351 0.943 2.87
0.357 0.982 2.72
0.340 0.971 2.71
0.331 1.000 2.78
0.347 1.034 2.66
0.357 1.082 2.63
0.377 1.12.2 2.58
0.356 1.136 2.64
0.342 1.180 2.62
0.332 1.265 2.65
0.314 1.296 2.66
0.312 1.215 2.50
0.327 1.194 2.50
0.332 1.221 2.55
0.526 1.275 2.70
171.327
176.412
176.869
180776
154,947
166,933
193,377
195,460
211,198
226,266
233,228
243 980
258 714
254 865
226042
191,974
180 000
186 020
198 201
197 018
208 232
194 062
198 646
207 987
228 232
252 779
262 747
261,255
252,320
244,632
256,478
264,588
269,106
i
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_A/A
_dl
-0. 017
0.039
0. 002
0.040
0.O07
-0.0_8
0.034
-0.010
0.072
0.013
-0.076
0.072
0.052
0.011
0.016
0.052
-0.0!0
-0.005
-0.007
0.020
-0.043
0.024
0.023
0.011
0,072
0.039
0.059
-0.01o
0.021
0.048
0.050
0.044
O. 003
0.016
0.071
0.021
.0.044
-0.017
0.016
O.O24
A(t)
i.000
O.983
1.021
1.023
i. 064
i. 071
I. 041
i.076
I.065
i.142
i.157
i.069
i.146
1.183
1.196
1.215
1.254
1.241
i.235
I.226
i.251
1.197
1.226
i. 198
1.211
1.298
1.549
I.429
i.415
I.445
i.514
1.590
i. 660
1. 665
1.733
i. 856
i. 895
i.812
i.781
1.810
1.853
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The Jor_enson and Griliches Departure
Perhaps the most controversial study on technological growth as
measured by the residual was published in 1967 by Jorgenson and Griliches,
both econometricians of note.l-/ Primary reason for the controversy is
that their value for the residual is at odds with virtually every other
researcher's results to date.
According to Jorgenson and Griliches, over the period 1945-1985
the residual accounted for only some 2.8 percent of a total growth in out-
put of 5.59 pereent--a mere 0.i percent point of the total. The remainder
is held to have resulted from increases in inputs.
This is certainly at odds with the %t.her results reviewed here,
as well as many others we have not included. 2-/ In fact, this divergence
of results inspired the U. S. Office of Business Economics to commission
Edward Denison to explore and comment on the work by Jorgenson and Giliches.3/
Jorgenson and Griliches set out to prove that the high residuals
resulting from previous work were a result of errors that had been made in
quantifying the inputs for labor and capital. Accordingly, the J & G model
is /
m n
_" qiYi = _ pjxj (5)
i=l J =i
where: Yi = quantity of the ith output,
xj = quantity of the jth input,
qi = price of the ith output, and
pj = price of the jth input.
I_/ D. W. Jorgenson an4 Z. Griliches, "The Erplanation of Productivity
Change," The Survey of Current Business_ May iq69.
J For a review of results prior to 1966, see Lave_ OP. cit.
3_/ Edward Denison, "Some Major Issues in Productivity- Analysis: An
Examination of Estimates by Jorgenson and Gril._ches_" The Surve Z
of Current Business, May 1969.
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They differentiate (3) to obtain
_.wi + Yi
where : wi =
qiYi
qiYi
and :
P,iXj
vj = _, pjxj
pj xj
+
which are the relative shares of the ith output within the total output
and the jth input within the total input, respectively. Next, defining
total productivity in terms of a Divisia index number, P, J & G develop
an expression for the rate of growth of total factor productivity as
m
P Yi
They further show that the growth rate of total factor productivity is
zero if and only if the shift in the production function is zero. (A
shift in the production function would mean that technological progress
has occurred.)
Using the U. S. private domestic net product for output, plus a
host of input series and weighting factors, they begin a sequential process
of "eliminating errors" in previous research. The process consists of
six steps, the results of which are shown in Table A-3, whereby the residual
is sequentially reduced from 46 percent to a mere 2.8 percent of the growth
of output.
Significantly, the initial estimate of productivity (46 percent)
is essentially consistent with the findings of Kendrie_ and Denison. In
the J & G process of "eliminating errors" of previous research, however,
the contribution of the residual begins to diverge from commonly found
results. However, in his analysis and critique of the J & G work for DBE,
Denison analyzed these results in the light of his previous work and was
able to attribute all but 0.33 percentage points of the difference between
his residual and J & G's residual to differences in te(hniques or data.
A-24
]
1
1
1
1
1
]
m
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
_TABLE A-3
TOTAL OUTPUT, INPUT, AND FACTOR PRODUCTI'TITY _ U. S.
PRIVATE DOMESTIC ECON0_4f, 1945- 65
(Average Annual Rates of Growth)
(1) (2) (3)
Input Productivity[(3/1)(100)
i. Initial estimates $.49 1.83 i. 60
Estimates after correction
for
2. Errors of aggregation 3.39 1.8! I.A9
3. Errors in investment goods 5.$9 2.12 1.4:1
prices
A. Errors in relative utiliza- 5.$9 2.57 O. 96
tion
5. Errors in aggregation of 5.59 2.97 0.58
capital utilization
6. Errors in aggregation of 5.59 3.47 0.i0
labor services
_6.0%
_A.0%
61.5%
26.8%
16.2%
2.8%
Source: Jorgenson and Griliches, op. ci___t.
In analyzing the methodology used by Jorgenson and Griliches, as
well as the critical review by Denison_ we too conclude that the Jorgenson-
Griliches methodology and assumptions err in two dimensions. First_ they
do not "correct" previous errors_ but instead alter the assumptions. Second_
they introduce new errors in conception. Their original results (the
initial estimates shown in Table A-5)_ seem a reasonable and consistent
assessment of the role of technological progress in economic growth. Their
subsequent refinements_ however_ act to understate the contribution of the
technological component through (a) erroneous assumptions; and (b) embodi-
ment of much of the evidence of technological progress within the base data
series used_ so that their effects are prematurely subtracted.
Prosress Toward Quantification
The review of approaches and progress toward quantifying the role
of technological progress in economic growth which we have presented in this
paper is intended solely as an illustrative overview of the current state
of the art, and not an exhaustive treatment. Because of the importance and
widespread interest in the topic, economic literature is understandably
replete with variations on the major themes sketched here. Perhaps the
cardinal point for our present purposes, then, is that the results of these
variations are also largely in line with the main stream described here.
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Mansfield has summarizedthe empirical progress on technological
contribution in these words:
Although the studies are useful, the results are
extremely rough. Becauseof the complex inter-
actions amongthe various factors that affect
the economic development of a country it is
difficult to estimate from historical statistics
the precise effect of a nation's rate of tech-
nological change on its rate of economic growth.
All that can safely be said is that the effect
has been substantial, l-/
One of the more frequently cited shortcomings of estimates de-
veloped by either a production function or a total factor productivity
approach, of course, is that each misses those benefits of technological
progress that cannot be measured within the limitations of the existing
methodologies. At least some of the culturally important fruits of tech-
nological progress that materially affect our American life styles (e.g.,
new and improved final products) are not yet adequately reflected in either
the economic residual or the productivity gains methodologies.
-;
Simply, then, the present state of the art in economic measure-
ment precludes comfortably precise estimates of all of the dimensions of
technological progress and all of its total and component effects on
economic growth.
Nevertheless, the results that have been obtained are far _rom
discouraging. Indeed, use of fairly conventional applications of produc-
tion theory alone have yielded insights into (a) the aggregate economic
role of technological progress, (b) the relative importance of factor
inputs, and (c) the genuine importance of inputs exogenous to capital and
labor. And these would appear to suffice for our objectives here.
Moreover, results of other research--which we have described here
in some detail for the specialist--support the findings of our research. The
high frequency with which researchers--often using different methodologies--
conclude that technological progress plays a major role in economic growth
lends credibility to the research which depends on nonquantitative evidence
to explain technology's role in the productien process. These mutually
supportive findings are difficult to dismiss as meaningless.
l_/ Mansfield, op. ci__t., p. 5.
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APPENDIX B
CALCULATION OF A t AND Gt
This appendix contains the data and indicates the calculations
performed in developing:
i. A t for the period 1949 through 1968
2. At for the period 1909 through 1968
5. Gt for the period 1949 through 1968
The following sections describe each of these.
i. A t FOR 1949-68
Calculations of A t are based on the methodology developed by
Solow which has been previously described in Chapter VI and Appendix A.
Table B-1 shows the data used in the calculations and the results. Columns
l, 2, 4_ 5 and 6 are input data for the calculations and 3,7 and 8 are
arrived at computationally.
The base data used in developing entries in the data columns and
the computations used in each case are discussed below:
Col .i:
Coi.2:
Percent Labor Force Employed
1949 taken from Table A-2
Labor force is defined here as private, civilian, non-agricultt_ral.
The percentage employed was derived from Table B-2 and Table B-3.
The calculations are self-explanatory.
Capital Stock
Gross stocks for all industries (constant cost 2) taken directly
from Survey of Current Business, Department of Commerce, April
1970, p. 23, Table 1-Constant Dollar Gross and Net Stocks,
1925-68.
Col. 3: Col. 2 X Col. 3
Col. 4: Share of Property in Income
Share of property in income was calculated as shown in Table
B-4 with specific table and line references indicated a_ left.
B-1
Col. 5:
Col. 6:
Col. 7:
Col. 8:
Private nonfarm GNPper Man-Hour
Derived from private nonfarm GNPdivided by man-hours in
non-agricultural establishments as shown in Table B-5.
Employed Capital per Man-Hour
Calculated by dividing employed capital in Col. 3 by the man-hour
series from Table C.
AAIA = A515-4(A6.16)
A(t +l)= A (t)[1 + AA (t)/A (t)]
2. A t FOR 1909-1968
Table A-2 contains the series for A t from 1909 through 1949.
In that the calculations of A t for 1949-1968 required new data series,
we chose to set A1949 = 1.0 to initiate the calculations. It is thenT
possible to adjust our-series--which indicates progress since 1949--to
a base of 1909 by normalizing our series with Solow's ending A1949 of
1.853 by multiplying each of our At in 1949-1968 by 1.853. Table B-6
shows the result of this calculation in the 1949 through 1968 time period.
J
I
!
I
]
]
]
]
I
3. Gt FOR 1949-1968
As described in Chapter VI.
Qt
Gt = Qt -
At
where: Qt = Observed output in year t and
A t = Technology level in year t.
Table B-7 shows the data and calculated results with output taken at GNP
deflated constant 1958 dollars in millions and with Gt calculated relative
to 1949 technology.
B-2
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B-3
PERCENT OF PRIVATE,
Year
(i) (2)
Nonagr. Gov 't
Employed Employed
TABLE B-2
C_IVILIAN_ NONAGRICULTURAL LABOR FORCE EMPLOYED
(000 )
(Z) (5) % Labor
Col. (4) Col. Force Emp.
i - 2 Unemployed 3 + 4 Col. 5 _ 5
1950 51,760 6,026 45,734
1951 53,239 6,589 46,850
1952 55,755 6,608 47,145
1955 54,922 6,645 &8,277
1954 55,905 6,751 47,152
1955 54,724 6,914 47,810
1956 57,517 7,278 50,239
1957 58,125 7,616 50,507
1958 57,450 7,859 49,611
1959 59,065 8,083 50,982
1960 60,318 8,355 51,965
1961 60,546 8,594 51,952
1962 61,759 8,890 52,869
1965 63,076 9,226 55,850
1964 64,782 9,596 55,186
1965 66,726 10,074 56,652
1966 68,915 10,791 58,124
1967 70,527 11,598 59,129
1968 72,103 11,848 60,255
1969 74,296 12,226 62,070
Source: Cols. I and 4: Employment
Vol. 16,
Col. 2: See Table B-5.
3,288 49,022 95.5
2,055 48,905 95.8
1,883 49,028 96.2
1,834 50,iii 96.3
5,552 50,684 95.0
2,852 50,662 94.4
2,750 52,989 94.8
2,859 55,366 94.6
4,602 54,213 91.5
3,740 54,722 93.2
5,852 55,817 93.1
4,714 56,666 : 91.7
3,911 56,780 93.1
4,070 57,920 93.0
5,786 58,972 93.6
5,566 60,018 94.4
2,875 60,999 95.3
2,975 62,104 95.2
2,817 63,072 95.5
2,831 64,901 95.6
and Earnings, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
No. ii, May 1970, p. 25.
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TABLE B-S
CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(000)
Year Federal State and Local Total
1950 1,928 4,098 6,026
1951 2,502 &,087 6,589
1952 2,420 4,188 6,608
1953 2,505 4,540 6,645
1954 2,188 6,565 6,751
1955 2,187 4,727 6,914
1956 2,209 5,069 7,278
1957 2,217 5,399 7,616
1958 2,191 5,648 7,859
1959 2,255 5,850 8,083
1960 2,270 6,085 _,355
1961 2,279 6,315 8,59&
1962 2,540 6,550 8,890
1965 2,558 6,868 9,226
196& 2,348 7,248 .; 9,596
1965 2,578 7,696 10,074
1966 2,56& 8,227 10,791
1967 2,719 8,679 11,3§8
1968 2,759 9,109 11,848
1969 2,757 9,469 12,226
Source: Employment and Earnings, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Vol. 16, No. ii,
May 1970, p. 51.
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Year
TABLE B-5
PRIVATE N0_YFARM GNP PER MAN-HOUR
Priv. Nonfarm
GNP Man-Hours in GNP Per
(billions) Nonagr. Estab. Man-Hour
(1958 $) (billions) _ 5 . 5
19&9 266.2 90.56
1950 29&. 9 9&. 05
1951 516.2 99.82
1952 52&. 2 i01.61
1955 5_0.7 105.94=
195_ 355.0 lO0.4=5
195"5 56&. & 104-.81
1956 371.4- 107.79
1957 577.2 107.66
1958 570.9 lOS. 85
1959 598.5 108.4-2
1960 4-07.6 109.82
1961 4-14.8 109.56
1962 &_4.6 112.70
1965 4-63.8 1]_5.06
196_ 4-91.2 i18.02
1965 52.1.7 125.5&
1966 552.5 129.17
1967 575.5 151. A5
1968 604-. 2 154-. 62
2.94-6
5.156
5.168
5.191
5.278
5.335
5.4-77
5.4&6
5.50A
3.572
5. 674-
5.712
5. 795
5.94-5
4-.051
4-.162
4-.2_50
4. 276
&.563
4-.4-88
Source: National Income and Products Accounts of U. S., Department of
Commerce, Table 1.8, line 4.
Business Conditions Digest, Department of Commerce, February
1970, Table 48, p. 108.
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Year
19_9
1950
1951
1952
1953
195&
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
196_
1965
1966
1967
1968
TABLEB-6
At FOR1949-1968 _TIVE TO1909 TECHNOLOGY
At (19_9 Base)
1.000
1.060
i. 067
i. 068
1.093
1.102
1.144
1.128
1.155
i.l&7
1.178
i.185
i. 2O5
1.2_6
1.268
1.502
i.319
1.327
i.34:5
1.371
At (1909
B-8
1. 853
1.96&
1.977
1.979
2.025
2. O&2
2.120
2.090
2.103
2.125
2.183
2.196
2. 233
2.309
2.350
2.&13
2.ii4=
2._59
2. &89
2.5&O
Base)
J
1
1
1
l
1
1
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TABLE B- 7
Year
1949
1950
1951
1952
1955
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
Totals
Output
(millions),
266,900
294,900
516,200
324,200
540,700
555,000
36_,400
371,400
377,200
370,900
398,500
407,600
414,800
444,600
463,800
491,200
521,700
552,500
575,500
604,200
8,235,100
CALCIIIATION OF Gt
(1949 Base Technology)
A_!t
Output
At
i. 000
i. 060
i. 067
1.068
I. 093
i. 102
i. 144
I. 128
i. 135
i. 147
I. 178
i. 185
i. 205
I. 246
1. 268
1.302
i .319
1.527
1.345
1.371
266,200
278,208
296,545
305,558
311,711
505,993
518,551
529,255
552,535
325,365
558,115
543,966
344,252
556,822
565,775
577,266
595,527
416,202
427,029
&40_.700
6,869,155
Gt
(millions)
16,692
19,855
20,642
28,989
31,007
45,869
42,145
44,865
47,535
60,185
63,634
70,568
; 87,778
98,027
113,954
126,175
156,098
146,471
163;500
1,365,967
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APPENDIXC
ADJUSTMENTS TO G$
As discussed in Chapter VII, the determinants of Gt found to have
a significant effect on G t during the 1949-1968 time frame were:
I)
2)
3)
Sex-mix changes in the work force
Education of the work force
Research and development
Tables 5 and 7 of Chapter VII indicate the index values of labor quality
changes as a result of these determinants°
In that both factors are related to the quality of the work force
and therefore reflect productivity measures relative to the 1949 level, it
is easy to adjust the data in Table B-I, Columns 5 and 6 to reflect labor
quality changes.
The procedure is as follows:
i) To adjust for sex-mix changes, divide "GNP per man-hour"
and "capital per man-hour" by the corresponding year's index value.
2) Recalculate A t. The new A t will reflect the applied tech-
nology level without the effect of sex-mix changes.
3) Recalculate Gt. These are the gains due to the remaining
determinants of technological progress.
4) Calculate the difference between the original Gt and the new
Gt. This difference represents the contribution to Gt from sex-mix changes.
5) Multiply the indexes for sex-mix changes and education for
corresponding years.
6) Repeat steps i through 4. The result yields the combined
effects of sex-mix changes and education. Tables C-I and C-2 show the
results of the various computations for sex-mix changes and education,
respectively.
C-1
Year
TABLEC-I
SEX-MIX CHANGES
(3)
(i) (2)
_t A__i _A
(4)
Gt
A
(5)
Gt
For
All DET
(6)
Gt
Due To
Sex-Mix
Cha_n_es 5-4
.949 266,2 1,0 266,2 0 0 0
.950 294,9 1,05877 278,53 16,369 16,692 0.525
.951 516,2 1,06615 296,59 19,615 19,855 0,242
.952 324,2 1,06614 504,09 20,112 20,642 0,550
.955 540.7 1.08934 512.76 27.942 28.989 1.047
954 555.0 1.0977 505.18 29.816 31.007 1.191
955 564.4 1.15859 520.10 44.299 45.869 1.570
.956 571.4 1.]_217 551.10 40.500 42.145 1.845
.957 577.2 1.]2788 554.43 42.767 44.865 2.098
.958 570.9 1.1597 525.44 45.463 47.555 , 2.072
.959 595.5 1.16977 540.49 57.806 60.185 2.379
_960 407.6 1.17524 546.82 60.777 65,654 2.857
_961 414.8 1.19398 547.41 67.591 70.568 3.178
_962 444.6 1.23579 560.55 84.247 87.778 3.551
_963 465,8 1,25576 569,54 94,462 98,027 3,565
,964 491.2 1.28763 381.48 109.724 115.934 4.210
L965 521.7 1.30325 400.51 121.393 126.173 4.780
L966 552.3 1.3102 421.54 130.761 136.098 5.337
[967 573.5 1.32409 433.128 140.372 146.471 6.099
L968 604.2 1.35037 447.433 156.767 163.500 6.732
constant $'s.* All $'s in billions of 1958
C-2
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(1)
TABLE C-2
SEX-MIX AND EDUCATION CHANGES
(4)
(3) %
(2) £ £
At A Q - A
m
(5)
Gt
For
A11 DE T
1949 266.2 1.0 266.2 0 0
1950 294.9 1.05247 280.2 14.702 16.692
1951 516,2 1,05279 300.3 15,855 19,855
1952 524.2 1.04577 510.0 14.189 20.642
1953 340.7 1.06163 520.9 19.778 28.989
1954 355.0 1,0626 515.3 19.700 31.007
1955 364.4 1.09447 332.9 51.455 45.869
1956 371.4 1.06663 348.2 23.200 42.145
1957 377.2 1.06906 352.8 24.367 44.865
1958 370.9 1.0733 345.6 25.330 47.555
1959 398.5 1.09424 364.0 34.500 60.185
1960 407.6 1.09169 575.4 34.254 63.654
1961 414.8 1.10226 576.3 58.482 70.568
1962 444.6 1.13257 592.6 51.972 87.778
1965 465.8 1.14495 405.1 58.710 98.027
1964 491.2 1.16717 420.8 70.555 115.954
1965 521.7 1.17441 444.2 77.477 126.173
1966 552.5 1.17295 470.9 81.428 136.098
1967 575.5 1.17785 486.9 86.596 146.471
1968 604.2 1.19436 505.9 98.322 163.500
Total
* All $'s of 1958 constant $'s.in billions
1,363.967
(6)
Gt
Due To
Sex-Mix And
Education
0
i. 990
4.000
6.453
9.211
11.307
14.416
18.945
20.498
22.205
25.885
29.400
52,086
55.806
39.317
43.581
48.696
54.670
59.875
65.178
543.519
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APPENDIXD
In order to quantitatively describe the G(R&D)generation pattern,
it is necessary to combine two assumptions made--the initial G(R&D)distri-
bution and the lifetime distribution. Both of these distributions were
assumedto be Poisson. The initial G(R&D)distribution has a meanof 3
years whereas the lifetime distribution has a meanof 4 years.
To combine these distributions, we assumethat the occurrence
of initial G(R&D)is independent of the lifetime of the G(R&D)stream
ensuing from a particular R&Dactivity. Making this assumption of inde-
pendence allows one to combine the distributions additively. From a
theoretical standpoint, the sumof two independent Poisson distributions
with means _I and _2 is a Poisson distribution with mean _i + _2" In this
case_ this would indicate that the G(R&D)generation pattern is a Poisson
distribution with a meanof 7 years. Our actual G(R&D)generation pattern
is a close approximation to this theoretical distribution.
The G(R&D)generation pattern departs from the theoretical dis-
tribution because we have truncated both the initial G(R&D)distribution
and the lifetime distribution to something less than the maximumvalues.
The G(R&D)generation pattern was, therefore, developed by the process of
convoluting the two distributions. The process can be described as follows:
Defining
Then
Pk " the probability the G(R&D) will be occurring in
year k after R&D performance,
_i _ the probability that initial G(R&D) occurs in
year i after R&D and
8j = the probability that the lifetime of a G(R&D)
stream is j years,
_= Z Z _i8j for all i + j = k and k = O, .... , n.
ij
The Pk'S are then the yearly probabilities that G(R&D) is being generated
by some R&D activity. Table 14 in Chapter VIII indicates the yearly prob-
abilities for each year from O--the current year--through the 18th year.
D-I
APPENDIX E
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The functional relationship between past R&D and G(R&D)--in a
time series relationship--was determined by least-squares regression. Data
requirements consisted of R&D performance and G(R&D). The series for
G(R&D) developed in Chapter VII and shown in Table lO served as input data
for the regression. Data used for R&D performance are discussed below.
THE R&D SERIES
In order to obtain a sufficiently long series for total U.S. R&D
performance, it was necessary to utilize a multitude of sources. Table E-1
contains the series _current dollars and GNP deflated) used in the computa-
tions. Sources for specific current dollars annual figures are discussed
below:
"/
1937-1938
Taken from U.S. Department of Commerce, Long Term Economic Growth
1860-1965, Bureau of the Census; October, 1966; pp. 198-99, Cols. B-52 and
B-S3, and increased by 16 percent for greater conformance to more recent
trends.
1939
Interpolated between 1938 and 1940 data.
1940-1948
Taken directly from source cited for 1937-1938 data above.
1949-1950
Taken from Raymond H. Ewell, "Role of Research in Economic Growth,"
Chemical and Engineering News, Vol. 33, No. 29 (July 18, 19S5).
E-1
1951
Taken from Leonard H. Silk, The Research Revolution, McGraw-Hill
Publishing Company, New York, 1960.
1952
Taken from reference cited for 1949-1950 data.
1955-1968
Taken directly from National Patterns of R&D Resources, 1955-1970,
National Science Foundation, NSF 69-30, September 1969.
The above base figures are also shown as deflated by the GNP
deflator to 1958 dollars.
WEIGHTED R&D SERIES
Utilizing the G(R&D) generation pattern weights as shown in
Table 14, Chapter VIII, the deflated R&D series can be used to determine
the sum of past R&D expenditures for any year for which 18 past data points
are available. Because the R&D series begins in 1937, the first year avail-
able for use is 1955. Table E-2 contains the series for Rt for t from
1955 through 1968.
J
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The 14 data pairs available(1955-1968) were then analyzed to
ascertain the parameters for the hypothesized linear model relating G(R&D) t
and Rt developed in Chapter VIII. The results obtained indicate a close
relationship of the data to the hypothesis. Specifically, the results were
that
G(R&D) = -_954.15 + 7.25217 Rt:.
The coefficient of dete_nmination was 0.970161, the highest of any forms
that were empirically estimated.
E-2
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1
Year
1957
1958
1959
1940
1941
1942
1945
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1955
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1965
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
TABLE E-I
TOTAL U. S. R&D
($ millions)
Current $*
261
505
550
545
900
1,072
1,210
1,580
1,520
1,780
2,260
2,610
2,800
5,560
4,000
4,500
5,207
5,758
6,279
8,485
9,912
10,870
12,540
15,750
14,552
15,665
17,571
19,215
20,449
22,285
25,680
25,350
1958$
GNP Deflated
586.5
694.8
765.9
785.9
1,906.8
2,022.6
2,150.5
2,571.1
2,546.1
2,668.7
5,029.5
2,278.9
• _,559.8
4,189.5
4,672.9
5,142.9
5,896.9
6,404.0
6,907.6
9,024.5
10,166.2
10,870.0
12,542.5
15,291.4
15,912.0
14,806.2
16,204.5
17,644.6
18,459.1
19,565.4
20,156.1
20,711.4
. See text for source.
E-3
Year
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
* In millions of 1958 constant $'s.
TABLE E-2
WEIGHTED R&D
E-4
Pit _
3,455.86
3,847.03
4,295.20
4,812.02
5,415.90
6,124.72
6,944.93
7,864.75
8,855.92
9,883.76
10,920.50
11,954.40
12,987.70
14,026.10
7
_fJ
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
N
,f
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
!
APPENDIX F
RATE OF RETURN CALCULATION
The simplest methodology for calculating a rate of return on an
investment is illustrated below:
% Rate of return on investment = Net Income
Investment
ioo% (i)
If income occurs over more than I year, the rate can be divided by the
time span to obtain the average annual rate of return.
In our case, the $7.23 return minus $i.00 investment yields a
net income of $6.23 over an iS-year period. Using (i) above,
% Rate of return = 6.23 (i00) = 623% or
1.00
Annual % rate of return = 62__3S= 34.6% .
18
Using (1),however, implicit!y assumes a uniform series of discounted
net income. This is clearly not the ease with the G(R&D) generation pattern
due to its bell-shaped characteristics. To accurately calculate the annual
rate of return, a more elaborate technique is required.
The methodology used to calculate an exact rate of return is
based on an iterative procedure in which successive "interest" percentages
are used to calculate the "present worth" of the stream of net cash flows.
The correct "rate of return" is that which causes the "present worth" of
negative flows to exactly equal the "present worth" of positive flows. We
applied the series of net cash flows resulting from the NASA 1959-1969 R&D
expenditure series (in 19S8 millions $) in calculating the exact rate of
return. Since the iterative procedure is a time consuming process, we
utilized a computer to perform the calculations. Table F-I shows the results
of the calculations with an annual rate of return of 33.1829 percent.
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APPENDIX G
MANUFACTJRING INDUSTRY LEVEL TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
As discussed in Chapter IX, the Solow model was applied to the 2-
digit manufacturing industries to yield some insight into the rate of tech-
nological progress at this level. Ultimately, the industry level comparisons
yield indications that the mix of activities among the industries can influ-
ence the actual gains in output due to technological progress to the U. S.
economy. This is due to the dramatically different rates of technological
progress between industries.
The methodology used was identical to that used for the private,
nonfarm sector. Data requirements and availability were, however, different.
As might be anticipated, the most difficult data to obtain at the industry
level was capital stock and output. Some assumptions and interpolations
were required to obtain series long enough to permit analysis.
Tables G-I through G-20 include the same data for all manufactures
and 2-digit manufacturing industries as Table B-1 for the private, nonfarm
sector except that the data sources were of necessity different. Sources
and treatment of the basic data used to analyze the industry level techno-
logical progress are discussed below.
Capital stock adjustment (CAP AIIT)--This column is identical to
Column i, Table B-I. It reflects the percent employed for the private,
nonfarm sector and is used to adjust capital stock in existence to reflect
"utilized capital stock." Ideally, this should vary by industry but is not
available at that level. Implicitly, then nonutilization of capital is
considered to be at the same level for each industry.
CAPITAL STOCK--The basic data series for capital stock for all
manufactures at the 2-digit level was obtained from Robert C. Wasson,
John C. Musgrave and Claudia Harkins, "Alternative Estimates of Fixed
Business Capital in the United States, 1925-1968," Survey of Current Business,
April, 1970. Gross stocks, constant cost2., for all manufacturing were
taken directly from Table 1 of the referenced study. This series was used
directly for all manufactures. The 2-digit industry level capital stock was
derived from this series by apportioning to the industry level based on its
percentage of total book value of depreciable assets in manufacturing. The
latter was obtained from the Census of Manufactures for 19S7 and 1963.
Annual percentages wer2 estimated from these two points assuming a linear
function. Individual industry percentages were then summed and normalized
to 100 percent.
G-1
Employed Capital (EMPLOYED CAP)--This column is obtained by
multiplying capital stock by the adjustment factor to reflect utilized
capital.
Capital's share in income (CAP SHARE)--Labor's share in income
was first calculated by developing the ratio of labor payments to income.
Specifically, payroll for all employees was divided by value added to
determine labor's share of income. Capital's share of income was then
calculated as one minus labor's share. The data were taken from Census
data for available years and Survey of Manufactures data were used to
fill in between the Census years.
Output per man-hour (OUTPUT/HOUR)--Output was taken as "value
added" and labor hours were a combination of "production workers" hours
and an adjustment to reflect nonproduction worker hours. Production hours
were multiplied by the ratio of total employees to production employees
since labor hours are only available for production employees.
Employed capital per man-hour (CAP/HOUR)--Labor hours calculated
above were utilized to divide employed capital as previously described.
The remaining two columns were calculated as has been previously
described.
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